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Virtue-theoretic approaches to the theory of knowledge aim to explain the nature and value 
of knowledge by appeal to the cognitive character of the agent. Robust virtue epistemology 
holds that knowledge is ‘true belief attained through cognitive ability’, and that no other 
conditions, such as an additional anti-luck condition, are needed to capture the nature and 
value of knowledge. In this thesis I defend robust virtue epistemology.  
 
In chapter one I outline criteria of adequacy for an account of knowledge. I explain how an 
account of knowledge should fit with natural language use and intuitive knowledge 
attributions and should make intelligible why we have the concept of knowledge that we do. I 
also explicate four guiding platitudes for a theory of knowledge: that knowledge has value, 
that knowledge is immune from luck, that knowledge is the product of ability, and that we 
have some knowledge.  
 
In chapter two I explain the emergence of robust virtue epistemology from two of its 
predecessor views, process reliabilism and agent reliabilism, and I explain why robust virtue 
epistemology holds great promise as an account of knowledge. I next present a central 
criticism of robust virtue epistemology that has been pressed separately by Lackey and by 
Pritchard. I explain how this criticism brings into focus the importance of the through 
relation in understanding robust virtue epistemology.  
 
In chapter three I survey three attempts to elucidate this through relation, and I explain why 
none are adequate. In chapter four I consider Pritchard’s alternative to robust virtue 
epistemology, which he calls anti-luck virtue epistemology; this view posits both a virtue-
theoretic condition and a separate anti-luck condition on knowledge. I argue that this view 
has weaknesses which warrant a return to robust virtue epistemology.  
 
In the fifth and final chapter I suggest two refinements to orthodox understandings of robust 
virtue epistemology. Firstly I propose that we understand the through relation using Mackie’s 
so-called ‘inus’ account of causation. Secondly I suggest that we understand cognitive 
abilities as relative to environments. I thus propose a new version of robust virtue 
epistemology, one which answers Lackey’s and Pritchard’s criticisms and so holds great 




Chapter One: The Project 
 
1.1 The Ubiquity of ‘Knows’ 
 
The word ‘knows’ has many different conversation uses. To assure people: ‘trust me, I know 
what I am doing’; as a defence for action: ‘I knew it would be fine’; to justify decisions: ‘I 
think we have enough petrol for this stretch, but I don’t know, so we’d better fill up’, to 
express doubt: ‘how do you know that?’ The term ‘knowledge’ and its cognates appears in 
almost every natural language in the world,1 one of only twenty-four or so words to do so, 
which suggests that the concept of knowledge plays an important role in our action and 
thinking. But what is it about knowledge that allows it to perform all these tasks? What does 
it mean to say that someone knows? What are the truth conditions of ‘S knows that p’, and 
what else might statements of this schema conversationally imply? Many epistemologists are 
engaged in the project of analysing knowledge. In the next section I say more about what this 
project aims to achieve and in section 1.3 I suggest some criteria of adequacy for such a 
project.  
 
1.2 What is the Project of analysing knowledge?  
 
The ‘project of explanation’ is the project of explaining what knowledge is, explaining the 
difference between knowing and not knowing.2 The first thing to note is that our everyday 
word ‘knows’ can be used to denote three different kinds of knowledge; context and 
grammatical structure determines which sense of ‘knows’ is being used.  ‘Sam knows Tom’ 
or ‘Laura knows Barcelona’ expresses knowledge by acquaintance; it expresses that he has 
met the person, or she has familiarity with the city. ‘Sam knows how to play chess’ or ‘Laura 
knows how to ride a bike’ expresses know-how; it expresses that the agent possesses a 
                                                
1 A term that appears in every, or almost every, known language is called a ‘universal 
lexeme’. See Wierzbicka, A. (2006: section 2.5). 
2 The expression ‘project of explanation’ appears in Greco (2010), where he distinguishes it 
from the project of vindication; he describes the latter as the project of demonstrating 
whether we have any knowledge and asking ‘what do, or can, we know?’ Greco (2010: 5). 
Clearly the project of explanation and the project of vindication are related – what knowledge 
is will have bearing on what we can know. This thesis is engaged in the former project – 
establishing what knowledge is. Rather than take up the project of vindication I assume that 
we do have a lot of knowledge, and that we indeed know much of what we take ourselves to 
know. Whilst not an intellectually satisfying response to those engaged on sceptical projects, 
it is a more fruitful approach to the project of explanation to assume that much of our 
everyday language use and intuitions about knowledge are correct. 
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certain skill or ability. Finally, ‘Sam knows what rabbits eat’ or ‘Laura knows that I am 
joking’ express propositional knowledge; it expresses that the agent stands in a particular 
relation to a proposition. It suggests, at least approximately, that they believe the proposition, 
that it is true, and that their belief is well-founded, justified or in some other way good. These 
three kinds of knowledge have some relations to each other, for example acquaintance with a 
city will often come with the ability to navigate around it, and knowing a person will usually 
mean knowing some facts about them. But epistemologists tend to be primarily interested in 
the project of explaining propositional knowledge, as this is an important concept, with 
intimate links to rationality and normativity.3 
 
The second thing to note is that the question ‘what is knowledge?’ admits of two distinct 
readings. One question is what kind of thing knowledge is: is it a natural kind, is it a 
linguistic entity, is it a social construct, is it an inferential node. This reading is a higher-order 
question, and is more fruitfully examined using the methods of metaphysics and metaethics. 
A second way to interpret the question ‘what is knowledge?’ is that it is asking ‘what are the 
conditions for knowledge?’: what properties must a belief and believer possess so that the 
belief is known, and not merely believed. It is looking for the first-order conditions that 
distinguish knowledge from mere true belief and other epistemic standings. This thesis 
engages the second question: I look for a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient 




So the project we are engaged in is finding the first-order conditions for propositional 
knowledge. What will a successful account of knowledge look like? Below I suggest some 
criteria for success in the project – what we are aiming to do. Getting clear on this question 
will be useful when we are assessing various accounts of knowledge in sections chapters 
three and four, and will help guide us when we develop a new account of knowledge in 
chapter five.4  
                                                
3 Zagzebski suggests two other reasons why epistemologists primarily focus on propositional 
knowledge. One reason is that it is via propositions that we pass information among people. 
The second reason is that it is via propositions, rather than experience, that reality becomes 
understandable to the human mind. Zagzebski (1999: 92). 
4 Additionally looking at the aims of the project is an important way to ensure that the 
methods implemented are appropriate. If for (hypothetical) example we are engaged on the 
project of exactly capturing and explaining natural language, collecting data on ordinary 
language use will be the vastly superior method. In contrast if we are trying to capture the 




Firstly, a successful account of knowledge will be in accordance with, and make intelligible, 
most natural language use regarding ‘knows’ and its cognates. It is a bad sign for a theory of 
knowledge if it entails that significant chunks of our language use are wrong. If we have a 
theory that knowledge is true belief, for example, this entails that all expressions such as 
‘hey, you didn’t know that, that was merely a lucky guess’ are mistaken or non-literal. This is 
a serious cost to the theory. A successful theory of knowledge should be able to explain 
paradigmatic uses of ‘knows’ in natural language and be able to explain what we are doing 
when we attribute knowledge in everyday contexts.  
 
If a theory of knowledge entails that there are a class of uses that are mistaken, it should be 
able to shed light on why we talk this way, and provide a story about why such false or non-
competent uses occur. It should also be able to make sense of non-literal, metaphoric uses of 
the term – uses which are strictly false but are clearly widespread, systematic and useful. As 
an illustration:5 A theory of knowledge might entail that only people, and not animals, can 
know. We often talk about animals as knowers, however, and a theory of knowledge should 
be able to make this intelligible.  Perhaps the theory suggests that knowledge is an honorific, 
and so when we say that our dog knows its way around the woods, knows what food it likes 
etc, we are tapping into the honourific aspect of knowledge attributions. We are proud of the 
dog, the dog has achieved something. Alternatively a theory may rule that only agents, but 
not machines or computer programmes, can know. We frequently say things like ‘Google 
will know’. A theory could explain such a use of ‘knows’ by proposing that knowledge 
functions as a way of tagging good informants, and it is this aspect which makes the 
expression intelligible: Google often acts like an informant. 
 
Not all conversational uses of ‘knows’ are equal: ‘Hey, you didn’t know that, that was merely 
a lucky guess’ feels like a literal use, and so is costly to explain away. Compare this to the 
soccer player who loses the game, but afterwards utters ‘I just knew I was going to win’. This 
doesn’t have the feel of a literal use; in fact it is easier to say it with some slight vocal 
emphasis on the ‘knew’, which is a linguistic marker for a non-literal use. Perhaps some non-
literal uses refer to the ‘feeling of knowing’6 rather than to propositional knowledge.  
 
                                                
5 I don’t mean to suggest here that I think animals can’t be knowers. The example is merely 
for illustration. 
6 The ‘feeling of knowing’ is the strong sense that you know the answer to something. It is a 
phenomenon in psychology, rather than philosophy, but it does seem that non-factive and 
non-belief uses of “knows” are often best explained by appealing to the feeling of knowing – 
the agent strongly felt that they knew. Nagel, J. (2007: 809-10). 
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As well as making true and intelligible most uses of ‘knows’, a theory of knowledge should 
also be able to shed light on the various conversational functions of knowledge attributions. 
Knowledge attributions frequently provide assurance, for example, as in ‘trust me I know’; 
they have a relation to praise and blame, as in ‘you knew what would happen’, which 
expresses that the speaker is blaming the agent for an outcome (more so than ‘you thought 
that would happen’ 7); and it is frequently used to solicit information, as in ‘does anyone 
know where to find good fishing’ or ‘excuse me, do you know where the station is?’8  
 
It can also be used as a way of praising people. On this John Greco writes:  
 
Note an important illocutionary force of knowledge attributions: namely, that when we 
attribute knowledge to someone we mean to give the person credit for getting things 
right.9 [emphasis mine] 
 
But also more generally knowledge attributions play an honorific role. ‘He doesn’t know 
anything’ is an insult in a way that ‘he doesn’t believe anything’ isn’t (even though both 
claims are almost certainly false, only the former has a distinctively insulting tone). 
 
Another criterion for a theory of knowledge is that it ought to make intelligible the various 
normative roles that knowledge plays. For example, it is often claimed that knowledge is the 
norm of practical rationality: if you know that p it is proper for you to act as if p.10 If this is 
right it might suggest pragmatic encroachment about knowledge. 11 Pragmatic encroachment 
holds that practical factors can affect whether the agent’s epistemic position with respect to p 
is sufficient for knowledge (or, to formulate it as a semantic thesis, practical factors affect the 
                                                
7 I owe this suggestion to Matthew McGrath.  
8 I once watched a speaker at an APA attempting to formulate a request for information 
without using “knows” or one of its cognates. It was instructive (and amusing) to see how 
difficult he found it. Eventually he gave up, and claimed that it could be done, it is just 
difficult. Given that his point was supposed to be that ‘knows’ is only one way of many to tag 
good informants, and so his difficulty ran counter to his claim, this vividly illustrates just 
how important the term ‘knows’ is when soliciting information in our community. Of course, 
we can approach people to ask for information without using ‘knows’, such as by asking ‘can 
you tell me where to find good fish?’ My point is not that it can’t be done, but rather that 
when asking for information we tend to use the term ‘know’.  
9 Greco (2003a: 111).  
10 For defences of this claim see Fantl and McGrath (2009: especially Ch. 5). See also Fantl 
and McGrath (2007), Stanley (2005) and Hawthorne (2004). 
11 Greco exemplifies someone who holds that knowledge functions as the norm of rational 
action, and so posits pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. Greco (2010: 78-80). See also 
Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005) and Fantl and McGrath (2009).  
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truth value of knowledge attributions).12 This is because if knowledge marks when you can 
act on your belief, then where a lot is at stake, you might be rational to act only if you have 
eliminated more error possibilities and gathered more evidence than usual. We should spend 
more time inquiring into those propositions that we have more reason to care about. So it 
takes less inquiry to reach the point of stopping when we are inquiring about less important 
propositions. Thus if knowledge is the norm for proper action then it is easier to know less 
important facts.  
 
Similarly it is often held that knowledge marks the end of inquiry – if you know that p you 
can stop inquiring as to whether p.13 And some hold that knowledge is the norm of assertion: 
one should assert only what one knows, or someone who asserts something known has done 
nothing wrong, qua assertion, from the epistemic point of view.14  
 
Of course, any of these norms – the norm of rational action, end of inquiry and assertion – 
might be mistaken. Perhaps knowledge does not play these normative roles. The fact that so 
many people hold that they do is itself, however, something to be explained. A successful 
theory of knowledge should either be able to make intelligible why knowledge plays these 
roles, or else be able to explain why it appears that it does so but in fact does not.   
 
As competent users of a concept we have intuitions about which cases fall under the 
extension of that concept. We can describe a case, real or imaginary, and have an intuition 
about whether the agent knows in this case. To illustrate, imagine that Sally throws a die and 
then makes a guess that it will land a six. As it happens she guesses correctly – the die did 
land a six. We have the intuition that in this case Sally didn’t know. Compare this to: Sally 
throws a die, she then looks to see what number it lands, and based on what she sees, believes 
that it lands a six. In this case we have the intuition that Sally knows that it landed a six.15 
                                                
12 A ‘better epistemic position’ with regard to p might include having ruled out more error 
possibilities about p, having more evidence with regard to p, being more justified, having 
been formed more cautiously, the beliefs being more modally stable etc.  
13 For a defence of the claim that knowledge marks the proper end of inquiry, see Kappel 
(2010: 75f), Kelp (2011) and Schaffer (2006). 
14 Note that the first formulation given above of the knowledge norm of assertion is a 
necessity claim (knowledge is necessary for epistemically proper assertion), the latter is a 
sufficiency claim (knowledge is sufficient for epistemically proper assertion). For more on 
the knowledge norm of assertion, see DeRose (2002), Lackey (2008: especially chapter 4).   
15 Note that if we are in a philosophy classroom or have recently been thinking about 
sceptical scenarios, our intuitions might waver on this point. But at least in the everyday case 
this is a clear case of knowledge. Perhaps it is another criterion for a successful theory of 
knowledge that it explains why our intuitions about the extension of the concept wobble 
when confronted with sceptical hypotheses.  
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These are intuitions about the extension of the concept. Our theory of knowledge should be 
able to explain this difference in our intuitions.  
 
The naïve theory that knowledge is true belief performs poorly on this score, as it rules that 
Sally knows in both cases. The theorist would have to either revise her theory to vindicate 
this intuition about the extension, or else explain the intuition away (provide an error theory), 
claiming that our intuitions are wrong in this case. In contrast, the theory that knowledge is 
safe true belief (a safe belief is any true belief where the agent couldn’t easily have been 
wrong16) does better on this score, as one cannot easily form a false belief by looking at the 
die, but one can easily be wrong by guessing the result. The theory that knowledge is safe 
true belief thus accounts for the difference in intuition. 
 
An influential family of cases that tap into the intuitive extension of knowledge are Gettier 
cases.17 Imagine that a person comes downstairs in the morning and looks at her grandfather 
clock. It says eight o’clock, and she forms the corresponding belief. As consulting clocks is a 
good way of telling the time, the belief is well grounded and justified. Unbeknownst to the 
agent, however, the clock had stopped at eight o’clock the previous evening. Thus she could 
easily have formed a false belief. But by chance the belief she formed was true in this 
instance – the clock stopped exactly twelve hours ago, and it is now exactly eight o’clock. 
Although the belief is justified and true, we do not intuit that it is knowledge. This is because 
there is a fissure between the agent and the truth: the agent didn’t get to the truth in the right 
way. It was not true because it was well formed, it was true only by luck.  Gettier cases share 
a general structure. Take a belief which is justified, but where some bad luck means that the 
belief-forming method would lead to a false belief in this case. A second piece of luck is in 
play, however, meaning that by happenstance the belief is true.18 We shall be returning to 
Gettier cases in section 2.3. 
 
                                                
16 For more on safety see Sosa (1999; 2000), and Pritchard (2005; 2007a; 2009e). 
17 This case is repurposed from Russell (1948: 170-1).  Gettier cases were originally 
conceived as a problem for the justified true belief account of knowledge. But they can be 
generalised. 
18 Unger describes Gettier cases as when there is luck between fact and agent. Unger (1968: 
159). Greco holds that in Gettier cases the agent gets to the truth via a deviant causal chain. 
Greco (2010: 75). Zagzebski (1994: 66 and 1996: 288-9) notes the double-luck structure of 
Gettier cases.  
 10 
Note that our intuitions about extension are not sacrosanct. A theorist need not hold the 
intuitions as fixed positions,19 but can instead explain the intuitions away. This is especially 
true at the periphery – as cases get convoluted, and intuitions waver, it is less costly to deny 
intuitions about extension. But it is a great cost to the theory to deny the intuitions about 
guiding or central cases (those that we are most sure about; that are clear-cut or paradigmatic 
cases of knowledge).20  
 
In addition to intuitions about the extension, we also have intuitions directly about the 
intension of the concept. These are insights we have as competent concept possessors 
regarding the meaning of concepts. We believe, for example, that whether S knows that p 
isn’t sensitive to what day of the week it is. Furthermore, we can access this day-of-the-
week-invariance platitude directly from our intuitive understanding of the concept, without 
proceeding via the intuitive extension. Whilst the day-of-the-week datum won’t be much help 
in formulating a theory of knowledge, there are other intuitions about the intension that have 
more bearing on our analysis.  
 
The following four intuitions about the intension are widely held, and I take it to be criterion 
for adequacy in the project of analysing knowledge that the theory either helps explain, or 
else can explain away, the four intuitions. There may be other intuitions, such as that 
knowledge requires ruling out salient error possibilities, or that knowledge requires having 
some reason for belief, or that you can’t know something if you have strong reason to believe 
it is false, but these intuitions as more controversial, and so don’t take them to be criteria for 
a theory.  
 
One platitude, or widely held intuition, is that knowledge has value.21 In particular, it seems 
                                                
19 ‘Fixed positions’ is data that we cannot deny, or that is very costly to dent. For more 
information on fixed points in philosophical methodology see Rawls (1971:19-20, 579-581; 
1993: 8, 124), See also Rawls (1975: especially section 2). 
20 There are many questions regarding the value and evidential weight of intuitions about the 
extension of the concept. There are related questions about whether the intuitions of 
philosophers are of more value and evidential weight than the intuitions of the ‘folk’. The 
judgements of philosophers may have more value because they have thought more about the 
concept or are better thinkers. On the other hand, the intuitions of the ‘folk’ may have more 
value because theorists’ intuitions are tainted by theory. This debate is intimately related to 
how we conceive of the aim of epistemology: whether we are trying to capture a folk concept 
or do something else. Alas whilst these questions of method and aim are fascinating, they lie 
beyond the scope of this project. For a useful overview of this topic see Nagel, J. (2007). 
21 For a useful overview of recent thinking about epistemic value see Pritchard (2007d). See 
also Pritchard (2010b: especially ch. 1) and Kvanvig (2003). That a theory of knowledge 
must be compatible with claims about the value of knowledge was emphasised by Kvanvig 
(2003: ch. 1) See also e.g. Zagzebski (1999), Williamson (2000: ch. 1). 
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that knowing that p is more valuable than other epistemic standings, such as luckily guessing 
that p. The exact nature and amount of the value of knowledge is contentious and in order to 
guide theorizing this platitude needs to be precisified.  
 
There are many different axes along which the value of knowledge platitude can be 
sharpened. One axis concerns how valuable knowledge is.22 The weakest claim holds merely 
that knowledge is valuable. The next weakest (often referred to as the ‘primary value 
assumption’, see footnote 22) holds that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief.23 
This claim would be vindicated if, for example, knowledge is justified true belief, and 
justified true belief is more valuable than mere true belief. A third available claim, stronger 
than the previous two, holds that knowledge is more valuable than a proper subset of its 
parts. (This claim is often referred to as the ‘secondary value assumption’.) Suppose, for 
example, knowledge is justified true belief plus some other condition to deal with Gettier 
cases. To be consistent with the claim that knowledge is more valuable than a proper subset 
of its parts, this extra condition must also contribute value to the whole. A fourth claim (the 
‘tertiary value assumption’) holds that knowledge is more valuable than the sum of its parts.24  
This platitude holds that when knowledge obtains some special value emerges, perhaps as a 
result of the arrangement of its parts. This latter value claim can be understood to hold that 
knowledge is more valuable than other epistemic standings not just as a matter of degree, but 
also of kind.  
 
There is a great deal of support for the weaker claims – those holding that knowledge is 
valuable and that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Knowledge is something 
that we seek out, and given the choice we would, all else being equal, rather know something 
                                                
22 I am taking this four-way taxonomy of the value of knowledge from Kvanvig (2003). See 
also Greco (2010: 93-97). Note that this taxonomy of the value of knowledge claims is 
distinct from Pritchard’s three way schema. For Pritchard’s summary of the various available 
value platitudes see Pritchard (2007d: 86-87, n 4; 2010: 5-13). I favour the Kvanvig/Greco 
analysis, in part because it explicitly recognises that someone who holds that knowledge has 
equal value to true belief still holds some positive thesis with regard to the value of 
knowledge.    
23 Two classes of philosopher will hold that the first value claim is the strongest one ought 
endorse. Firstly those who hold that knowledge simply is true belief will hold that knowledge 
is not more valuable than mere true belief. Sartwell (1992). Secondly some people may think 
that knowledge is true belief plus some other conditions, but that those other conditions do 
not make the whole any more valuable than mere true belief.   
24 The fourth claim doesn’t strictly entail the second and third value claims, as one could 
think that when all the parts of knowledge come together in the right way (in other words, 
when knowledge obtains) some of the parts, or their arrangement, detract from the value of a 
mere subset of the parts, rendering knowledge less valuable than a proper subset of the parts. 
I don’t know of anyone who holds this view.  
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than merely truly believe it. There is also some motivation to endorse the stronger claims. For 
one thing we tend to focus on knowledge, rather than other epistemic standings, in both 
everyday life and in our philosophical theorising. This suggests knowledge has a distinctive 
value, not shared by other epistemic standings. Support for the claim that knowledge is more 
valuable than a proper subset of its parts comes from the following consideration: Suppose 
knowledge can be rendered into constituents, call them A, B, C and D, and the first three 
constituents all contribute some value to the whole, but D doesn’t contribute any value. This 
would leave it puzzling why we care so much about knowledge rather than the whole formed 
by the parts A, B and C. This puzzling result pushes a theory towards claim that knowledge is 
more valuable than any proper subset of its parts. Pritchard has argued that we often treat 
knowledge as valuable for its own sake and so motivates the fourth value claim (that the 
difference in value that knowledge enjoys is a difference in kind, not merely in degree). He 
suggests that if the value of knowledge was just another spot on a continuum of value this 
leaves it puzzling why we tend to focus it.25 Note too that given the disagreement about the 
value of knowledge, it is an advantage of a theory if it is compatible with stronger claims 
about the value of knowledge, as this means it is consistent with more views and so more 
powerful. 
 
Given the strong case for thinking that knowledge possesses a distinctive value, I shall take 
the third claim, which holds that knowledge is more valuable than a proper subset of its parts, 
as a criterion for an account of knowledge. It would be a surprise to learn that this is false, 
given how much of our thinking focuses on knowledge in particular. There are two promising 
ways to meet this criterion. Firstly one may posit a set of conditions on knowledge and 
explain why each condition contributes some value to the whole; or secondly one may also 
endorse the fourth value claim, and hold that when knowledge obtains a distinctive value 
emerges. I return to these ways in sections 2.4 and 4.2. 
 
A second platitude is the anti-sceptical platitude. This intuition holds that we have some 
knowledge. This too needs to be sharpened up – we need to discern what kind of knowledge 
we have, for example, and about what topics. It seems fairly clear that we know many 
mundane facts, such as that there is a glass of water in front of me, but it is less clear that we 
know the tenets of metaphysics.26 This platitude is supported by the intuitive extension of the 
concept of knowledge, and also by appeals to natural language. We have strong intuitions 
                                                
25 Pritchard (2010: 7-8).  
26 A second example of the kinds of things we seem to not know is lottery propositions. It 
seems that we do not know that a given ticket in a very large lottery will lose, despite the 
overwhelming odds. A theory of knowledge should be able to explain this. For more on 
lottery propositions, see Hawthorne (2004: especially ch. 1).  
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that knowledge has a large extension, and our language reflects this; thus it is highly 
revisionary to claim that we don’t have (much) knowledge, or that we can only possess 
knowledge about a limited range of subjects. Thus it is a criterion of adequacy that a theory 
of knowledge entails that we know basic facts. 
 
The next two intuitions are more abstract and hence harder to formulate. The first is the anti-
luck intuition:  knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck. If S’s belief that p is 
merely luckily true – if she could easily have been wrong about whether p – then S does not 
know that p.  
 
Again the intuition needs precisifying. Knowledge is compatible with some kinds of luck: 
perhaps it was only by chance that the bank robber’s mask fell off during the raid, allowing 
the back teller to see the robber’s face clearly, and so recognise that the bank robber is Jesse 
James. Although it was only by luck that the teller was in a position to see the face and so 
form a true belief about the robber’s identity, this kind of luck does not preclude knowledge. 
We can call luck that is compatible with knowledge ‘benign’ luck. 27  28  
 
But knowledge is incompatible with other kinds of luck. If I guess that my veggie box will be 
delivered at 3.26pm based on the fact that, whilst it is delivered at a slightly different time 
every week, the average time for delivery is 3.26pm, then even if it is delivered at 3.26pm 
and so my belief is true, I did not know this. I could so easily have been wrong; my belief 
was only luckily true. Indeed I could have used great skill in calculating the average delivery 
time, but regardless of the skill involved we intuit that this isn’t a case of knowledge because 
of the luck involved. 29  
 
The kind of luck that is incompatible with knowledge is known as veritic luck. It can be 
characterised thus: it is a matter of luck, given how the belief is formed, that the belief is 
true.30 Veritic luck comes in two varieties, intervening and environmental. Intervening luck is 
the kind of luck in play in Gettier cases and the veggie box cases. Indeed some hold that the 
moral of Gettier cases, such as the one described above, is that knowledge is incompatible 
                                                
27 For a useful taxonomy of kinds of luck which are compatible with knowledge, see 
Pritchard (2005: 133-141). 
28 The Jesse James case is due to Nozick (1981: 193). 
29 The kind of luck involved in the Jesse James case is known as evidential luck (Evidential 
Luck: it was only by luck that the agent had access to the evidence). For a fuller account of 
various kinds of epistemic luck see Pritchard (2005, especially ch. 5 and 6). 
30 This characterisation is based on Pritchard (2005: 146). 
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with veritic luck.31 We shall be returning to environmental luck in section 2.6. Thus we can 
use as a guiding intuition about knowledge, and a criteria of adequacy for a theory, that it 
captures the way that knowledge is immune from luck.  
 
Lastly there is the ability platitude. This intuition about the intension brings together two 
interrelated strands of thinking about knowledge. Firstly, knowledge is the product of 
cognitive ability, as opposed to say, lucky guesses, or gullibly and irrationally held beliefs. 
To possess knowledge one needs to believe with competence. Additionally some aspects of 
the agent’s cognitive faculties or character (for example, their eyesight or their judiciousness) 
must be in play in the right way. We hold agents responsible for the knowledge they possess, 
and for this to be so, knowledge must in some way be attributable, or creditable, to the 
agent.32  
 
Closely connected with this strand of thought is a second idea. This one is more 
controversial33 and holds that saying that someone knows that p says something good about 
the cognitive character of the agent. It is very hard to criticise someone by saying that they 
know something, and in the typical case such an attribution praises them.34 This second 
strand of the ability platitude is supported by our linguistic behaviour (that claiming an agent 
knows is rarely, if ever, used as an insult, and that knowledge attributions often play an 
honorific role), and by the first strand of the ability platitude, which holds that in cases of 
knowledge the agent must have done something well. The agent must engage with the 
proposition in a responsible or skilled way – at the very least not be gullible or irresponsible 
in their belief forming. This suggests that knowledge is a state which entails something good 
about the agent.  
 
Notice that this claim is importantly distinct from the Credit Thesis account of knowledge.35 
                                                
31 Dancy (1985: 134); Pritchard (2005). 
32See Zagzebski (1996: 261). She writes ‘Knowledge is not merely something that happens to 
us but is something which we contribute to through our own efforts and skills… we claim our 
putative knowing states as our on and take credit or discredit for them.’  
33 For example Pritchard denies that the second strand is a platitude about knowledge, 
Pritchard (m.s; 2010), even though he endorses the weaker strand of the ability platitude.  
34 I believe the stronger claim that you can’t criticise them, at least from the epistemic point 
of view, by saying that they know, but such a strong claim is not required for my purpose 
here. 
35 The Credit Thesis is an analysis of knowledge that holds that S knows that p iff S deserves 
credit for the truth of her belief. See for example Greco (2003a). I do not discuss this view of 
knowledge here. For more on the distinction between a success being of credit to an agent 
(the agent deserves praise for the success) and the success being creditable to the agent (the 
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The Credit Thesis holds that a belief is knowledge iff the agent deserves some credit for the 
truth of her belief. This account is strongly influenced by the ability platitude, but the ability 
platitude, even in its second more controversial strand, merely holds that knowledge tends to 
be something that we praise agents for; it does not attempt to define knowledge this way, nor 
hold that agents always deserve praise for known beliefs.   
 
As an illustration of the ability platitude, consider the following case.36 Imagine Rene starts 
gambling. He randomly guesses roulette results, and thus believes via an unreliable and 
irresponsible method. Fortunately, but unbeknownst to him, there’s a guardian angel making 
whatever Rene believes true. The guardian angel changes the results of the wheel to conform 
to Rene’s beliefs. His beliefs couldn’t easily be false, so the anti-luck intuition is fulfilled, but 
we still don’t attribute knowledge to Rene. Why? I suggest that the reason is that he isn’t 
getting to the truth in the right way – his cognitive character doesn’t play the right role. 
Knowledge should be, at least in part, creditable to the knower. Rene’s epistemic abilities 
don’t cause his true beliefs, he believes any old thing and the world conforms. This is the first 
strand of the ability platitude. We intuit, furthermore, that he doesn’t deserve the status of 
knowledge. I suggest that the second strand of the ability platitude best explains this 
judgement. 
 
Thus a view of knowledge which doesn’t respect the ability intuition, and so says that Rene 
knows, fails on this account. The theory that knowledge is safe true belief, whilst performing 
well at capturing the anti-luck platitude, doesn’t perform as well with the ability platitude. 
Given that on this theory all that counts towards knowledge are the truth of the belief and its 
modal profile, the theory doesn’t countenance the aetiology of the belief. Once we notice this 
we can generate counterexamples to this view, as illustrated by the Rene case, by imagining 
beliefs that have the right model profile but don’t involve the agent’s abilities in the right 
way. 
 
These intuitions (value, anti-sceptical, anti-luck and ability) can be used in two distinct ways. 
One is to guide the theorising to begin with, so that we use the platitudes to shape the account 
of knowledge. The other way uses these platitudes to evaluate a view once it is offered, and 
                                                                                                                                      
agent played some role in the success such that it is (at least in part) attributable to them) see 
Pritchard (2010: 27).  
36 This case is found in Gardiner (2010). A similar version is used as a counterexample to 
process reliabilism. Greco (1999: 286). See also (Pritchard (2005: 187). In the original case 
the agent reasons according to the Gambler’s Fallacy. By making Rene not even care about 
the truth I have altered the case to make it even more clear that the agent doesn’t deserve the 
status of knowledge.  
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thus they play a role as criteria of adequacy.37 In chapter five I build an account of knowledge 
that I hope does justice to these four intuitions about the intension of the concept of 
knowledge.  
 
Another criterion for a successful account of knowledge is that it makes intelligible why we 
have the epistemic concepts that we do (and why the concept of knowledge is so widespread, 
so important, and used so much). This means that it is a strike against a theory if it is 
excessively complicated or unintuitive, so that it is unlikely that this concept would naturally 
have evolved in our socio-cognitive life. It is also a strike against the theory if the concept 
isn’t able to perform any useful function, or performs its supposed functions badly, or if some 
other simpler epistemic standing could have fulfilled the same function. This is because in 
these cases it is hard to see why we would have come to have such a concept. If knowledge is 
supposed to play the various normative roles outlined above, for example, but the account of 
knowledge offered means that we have very little access to whether we know, then it makes 
it hard to see how knowledge can fulfil its role.  
 
Thus a successful theory of knowledge will posit at least one important function for 
knowledge and explain how it performs this function. It will also cohere well with other 
everyday concepts we have. If we posit that knowledge is a kind of achievement, for 
example, then this construes knowledge as an instance of a familiar kind. This helps make it 
more intelligible why we have the concept. Similarly it is a virtue of a theory if it posits that 
knowledge comprises familiar concepts (such as reliability) or partially composes familiar 
concepts (such as understanding).   
 
Thus we have some idea of what a theory of knowledge is aiming at. There are guiding 
platitudes (value, anti-sceptical, anti-luck and ability) that an account of knowledge must be 
in accordance with, and we have some insight about how to use the intuitive extension of the 
concept and linguistic data to guide and test our theories. We also want the account to make 
intelligible why we have the concept of knowledge that we do, and to explain how it fulfils 
                                                
37 These platitudes can be used to drive a theory of knowledge. Sosa (2007) for example, 
presents the thesis that knowledge is valuable as a guiding platitude for his account of 
knowledge. (See section 3.3).Pritchard develops his anti-luck virtue epistemology from 
theorising about the anti-luck and ability platitudes. (see chapter 4 of this paper and Pritchard 
2009a; 2010; m/s). Plausibly contextualism about knowledge can be seen as arriving from 
trying to square the anti-sceptical intuition that we have some knowledge, with the view that 
knowledge requires ruling out relevant alternatives. Using these two guiding platitudes we 
are lead to contextualism about knowledge. Meanwhile the role that the intuitive intensions 
can play as a criterion for adequacy can be observed in my above criticism of the view that 
knowledge is safe true belief: the view didn’t adequately vindicate the ability platitude.   
 17 
functions in our socio-cognitive economy, our language and our thought. Our aim should be 
to create a theory which makes best sense of all of these considerations. We have seen that if 
we must deny some intuitions, or explain away some language uses or purported functions, 
then it should be less central ones – the figurative cases rather than the paradigmatic uses, the 
wavering intuitions rather than the fixed ones.  
 
 
Chapter Two: The Emergence of Robust Virtue Epistemology 
 
Now that we have seen our aims, we can move on to examine various accounts of 
knowledge. In section 2.4 and chapter five I argue that robust virtue epistemology holds great 
promise for satisfying these criteria. To fully appreciate the view, however, one must first 
look at the emergence of robust virtue epistemology from its predecessors.  
 
2.1 Process Reliabilism 
 
Margaret and Lauren are sitting in class. On hearing the door opening, Margaret turns to see 
who has entered. Recognising her classmate Timothy Margaret thinks ‘Oh Timothy is here’. 
Meanwhile Lauren is in love with Timothy, and is sitting at her desk daydreaming about him. 
On hearing the door open Lauren wishfully thinks ‘Oh, Timothy is here!’ Priscella 
introspects on how she feels about music and so concludes ‘I am a perfectionist piano 
player’. Markus reflects on the pleasing alliteration in the sentence, and therefore believes 
‘Priscella is a perfectionist piano player’. A skilled birdwatcher and an inexperienced 
birdwatcher are walking in the forest. ‘That is a pink-spotted flycatcher’ observes the 
birdwatcher carefully to himself, whilst the other guesses ‘That is a pink-spotted 
flycatcher’.38  
 
In each pair of cases the first person knows the proposition in question, and the second one 
doesn’t. A fruitful way to explain this extension of knowledge is by examining the belief-
forming processes employed. In the first case of each pair the belief is formed via standard 
cognitive processes: perception, introspection, memory, and good reasoning. In the second of 
each pair the belief is formed through wishful thinking, epistemically irrelevant aesthetic 
considerations, and guesswork. One important difference between the kinds of belief-forming 
processes is that the latter types of process are unreliable (they produce a large number of 
false beliefs compared to true beliefs) whilst the former processes are reliable (they tend to 
                                                
38 These examples are all adapted from Goldman (1979) The alliteration example originates 
from Kornblith. 
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produce true beliefs rather than false beliefs). Process reliabilism holds that this is what 
distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. A belief is known only if it is true and formed 
via a reliable method.39  
 
Process reliabilism: A belief is known iff it is a true belief that is the product of a 
reliable process, where a reliable process is one that tends to result in true beliefs.40  
 
Process reliabilism then, captures the way that knowledge, unlike merely true belief, is 
something on which we can rely. It articulates a way that knowledge enjoys veritic stability, 
and is not merely accidentally true. Process reliabilism also captures the thought that 
knowledge requires good cognitive contact with the world, as forming beliefs though reliable 
processes is a good epistemic practice.  
 
Process reliabilism also holds promise for explaining why the agent doesn’t know in Gettier 
cases. Recall that in the Gettier case described above the agent formed the true belief that it 
was eight o’clock by looking at a stopped clock. The reliabilist can respond that she fails to 
fulfil the conditions of knowledge because looking at a stopped clock is not a reliable way to 
form beliefs about the time. She would more often than not form a false belief via this 
method.  
 
Thus process reliabilism’s focus on how the belief is formed, and emphasis on reliability 
rather than mere luckiness, seems a promising approach to capturing the nature of 
knowledge. 
 
2.2 From Process Reliabilism to Agent Reliabilism 
 
Whilst process reliabilism is a promising start to an account of knowledge, the posited 
conditions are too permissive. Take the following case from Bonjour:41 Norman reliably 
forms true beliefs about a range of subjects through his clairvoyance. He has no particular 
reason to think that clairvoyance is reliable, or even that he has it. Norman generally accepts 
the beliefs in question, and never checks empirically to see whether the beliefs he forms are 
                                                
39 Process reliabilism is also known as generic reliabilism and simple reliabilism. Sosa 
(1992). For discussion of process reliabilism see Goldman (1977; 1979) 
40 Often the elocution ‘a higher preponderance of true beliefs over false beliefs’ is used. See, 
for Example Sosa (1992: 79). 
41 The case of the reliable clairvoyant is found in Bonjour, L (1985: 41-45). See also Bonjour, 
L. (2003: 28f).  
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true. These beliefs occur ‘spontaneously and forcefully.’42 Norman fulfils the conditions on 
knowledge set out by process reliablism. His true beliefs are formed via a reliable process, 
yet it seems clear that his clairvoyantly formed beliefs are not known. He isn’t a responsible 
or conscientious believer; he is not checking up on the truth of his beliefs. This case suggests 
that process reliabilism is too permissive – that not all reliable belief-forming processes are 
knowledge-conducive.  
 
When faced with this charge a reliabilist might hold that, in spite of our intuitions about the 
case, Norman does obtain knowledge from clairvoyance. Goldman takes this approach and 
holds that as Norman’s belief-forming process is in fact reliable; he knows his clairvoyantly 
formed beliefs. He then provides an error theory for our intuitions that Norman doesn’t 
know. He argues that as our judgements about knowledge attributions are formed in a world 
where clairvoyance is not reliable, we wrongly withhold a knowledge attribution in this 
case.43  
 
But such a response looks unappealing when we consider additional cases. Zagzebski 
describes an agent who gullibly but reliably forms beliefs.44 Again, it seems like the agent 
doesn’t know, but does fulfil the conditions. This suggests the agent needs to fulfil other 
conditions, in addition to using a reliable method. Plantinga offers a case where curious 
circumstances cause a person to develop a rare brain lesion. The effect of this brain lesion is 
that she strongly believes that she had a brain lesion. 45 The belief is thus true and reliably 
formed, yet we intuit that the agent isn’t justified in her belief, and so doesn’t know. 
Reflecting on this case may offer some insight as to why we judge that the agent doesn’t 
know: the belief-forming process is not well integrated with the rest of her cognitive 
character. In Greco’s terms, the brain-lesion beliefs are formed via ‘strange and fleeting’ 
processes46 and not via a stable and well-integrated part of her cognitive character. Were the 
agent to have had the condition for a long time or come to find out that such lesions exist, 
then we would be more inclined to judge that she knows in this case. Yet the reliability of the 
belief-forming method hasn’t changed – she would have had those true beliefs regardless – 
what has changed is how the belief-forming method has become integrated into her cognitive 
life. It has become a part of her cognitive character.  
 
                                                
42 Bonjour (2003: 28).  
43 Goldman (1993: 279). 
44 Zagzebski (1996: 305-8). 
45 Plantinga (1993a: 199; 1999). 
46 Greco (1999: 286-287). 
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This constraint on what counts as a knowledge-conducive process may arise because 
knowledge is something on which we rely and, even when reliable, the products of strange 
processes are not ones we can rely on. We can thus refine process reliabilism further to 
reflect this insight, such that that the cognitive traits in question must be stable aspects of the 
cognitive character of the agent. 
 
But what about the case of Rene the Gambler? Recall that Rene forms beliefs about a roulette 
wheel by simply guessing the results. Unbeknownst to him, he has a guardian angel changing 
the world so that his beliefs come out true. Given that he has this guardian angel, his beliefs 
are reliably formed – most of his beliefs are true – and so he fulfils the conditions of process 
reliabilism. Additionally his belief-forming process is a well-integrated and stable part of his 
character – he has been a cognitively irresponsible guesser for a long time – so he fulfils the 
refinements suggested above. Yet when we consider this case, it is clear that Rene doesn’t 
know. It seems that he is not getting to the truth the right way: the reliability isn’t coming 
from the agent. Furthermore Rene doesn’t care about the truth of his belief, and is doing 
nothing to ensure that his beliefs are true. This suggests further restrictions are required on 
what belief-forming processes and methods count as knowledge-conducive. Perhaps in order 
to know an agent must be motivated towards obtaining truth and avoiding falsehood, have 
subjective justification, and believe conscientiously.  
 
The above cases suggest that process reliabilism doesn’t capture every facet of knowledge. In 
particular, as the above cases illustrate, process reliabilism is inadequate at capturing how in 
cases of knowledge the agent’s cognitive character must be playing the right role in getting to 
the truth and must be responding appropriately to the facts. In other words, process 
reliabilism isn’t sufficiently attuned to the ability platitude. In contrast, when the processes 
are integrated, stable parts of the agent’s cognitive character, the true beliefs that they 
generate can be properly attributed to the agent: They are produced by her character.47 Call 
the resulting view ‘agent reliabilism.’48   
 
Agent reliabilism (necessity claim): S knows that p only if S’s true belief that p is the 
product of reliable cognitive traits that make up her cognitive character. 
 
                                                
47 See for example Sosa (1991: 276-277. He notes that only when the reliably formed true 
beliefs come from a stable and well-integrated capacity that the agent can ‘develop, exercise, 
retain and admire’ does the agent deserve credit for possessing the true belief.   
48 Many of these developments were made in Greco 1999; 2000). The ‘term agent 
reliabilism’ was introduced in Greco (1999: 288). Note that this is only a necessity claim on 
knowledge, not a bi-conditional. 
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Once we refine reliabilism to better reflect the demands of the ability platitude, the resulting 
view is also better positioned to explain other aspects of knowledge. By requiring that the 
relevant belief-forming methods be stable, for example, agent reliabilism better captures the 
anti-luck platitude than process reliabilism does: the sources of knowledge are sources that 
we can rely on. 
 
As these amendments shift focus away from the properties of the belief and belief-forming 
process, and towards the broader features of the cognitive character of the agent, they offer 
new avenues for explaining the value of knowledge. In particular, it seems, the extra value of 
knowledge might be the value of an agent performing virtuously. Thus we can see that 
dissatisfaction with process reliabilism has led theorists to develop a virtue epistemology, 
seating the agent at the heart of epistemic evaluation, and understanding person-level 
excellences as the fundamental element in epistemic evaluation. Knowledge is true belief that 
is virtuously formed. It is therefore a thesis about the ‘direction of analysis’ – that we can 
understand knowledge and epistemic value by looking at the more explanatorily fundamental 
properties of persons, rather than say, the properties of beliefs themselves.49 
 
This virtue epistemic idea leaves a lot of scope for different views on the nature of the 
relevant cognitive traits. One important question is whether they are best understood as 
faculties (eyesight, hearing, etc), or character traits (such as judiciousness, conscientiousness, 
etc) that we must learn and develop over time? Other questions concern how important 
reliability and motivation are in cognitive character. Virtue reponsibilists such as Zagzebski 
tend to emphasise the importance of character traits and the motivations of the agent. Virtue 
reliabilists such as Greco tend to emphasise the reliability component.50 I hope to remain 
ecumenical about this. I hope that my offered virtue-theoretic account allows for both 
faculties and character traits to count as cognitive virtues, because both kinds of capacity are 
part of the agent’s cognitive character, and so beliefs formed from both kinds are connected 
to the agents in the right kind of way (in accordance with the ability platitude). 
 
Note that agent reliabilism wasn’t intended by its earliest proponents to be a full account of 
knowledge.51 It was only supposed to be a significant necessary condition on knowledge, 
                                                
49 Greco (2010: 42). 
50 See for example Zagzebski (1996; 2003), Greco (1999; 2010); See also Pritchard 2009a: 
56-59).  
51 See, for example, Greco (1999, 2000). Greco claims that ‘a belief p has positive epistemic 
status for a person S just in case S's believing p results from stable and reliable dispositions 
that make up S's cognitive character’. [Greco (1999: 287, 295-96) emphasis mine] Note that 
this is importantly different from the claim that this fully captures the nature of knowledge. 
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augmented with a separate condition to capture other aspects, such as to eliminate 
knowledge-undermining luck. This position is now known as modest virtue epistemology, 
and we shall be exploring such one account in chapter four. The idea behind modest virtue 
epistemology is that virtue-theoretic conditions play an important role in understanding 
knowledge, but this does not entail the stronger thesis that the nature of knowledge can be 
entirely captured this way. Later views held that agent reliabilism could be developed into a 
full account of knowledge, which can be expressed with the following bi-conditional:  
 
Agent Reliabilism: S knows that p iif S’s true belief that p is the product of reliable 
cognitive traits that make up her cognitive character  
 
They held that we can entirely understand the nature and normativity of knowledge by 
exploring how the relevant person-level excellences produce true belief, and that no 
supplementary conditions, such as an explicit modal condition, are required in an analysis of 
knowledge.  
 
2.3 A Problem for Process Reliabilism 
 
But agent reliabilism (along with process reliabilism) faces a dilemma. How reliable must a 
process be in order for it to yield knowledge? Either the process must be perfectly reliable or 
not.52  If we opt for the former then we don’t have much knowledge since our belief-forming 
processes and faculties are fallible – we have few perfect, or nearly perfect, belief-forming 
methods. Such demanding conditions on knowledge thus make it bizarre that we talk and act 
as if we have a lot of knowledge. This suggestion therefore performs badly by the intuitive 
extension, ordinary language use and anti-sceptical criteria. It claims, for example, that the 
fact that our senses sometimes deceive us and our teachers are occasionally wrong entails 
that we can’t know anything from perception or from believing our teachers. This leads to a 
fairly wide-scope scepticism. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
In particular, Greco held that agent reliabilism couldn’t deal with Gettier cases. Greco’s agent 
reliabilist framework idea dates back at least as far as Greco 1995 (type script) quoted in 
Kvanvig (2003: 83-84).  
52 One may be tempted to think that this is a false dichotomy. This is because one might 
contend that a contextualist about the ‘reliability’ parameter can cut through horns by holding 
that in some contexts (where the stakes are high) the process needs to be very reliable, but in 
other contexts (where the stakes are low) the process need not be so reliable, in order for the 
process to yield knowledge. But even this contextualism will suffer the dilemma, because for 
each context we can ask the question ‘how reliable does the process need to be?’ and so find 
that the two horns appear at each context. 
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We can avoid this impending sceptical problem by making our notion of reliability less 
demanding: A cognitive process or faculty is reliable, and therefore knowledge-conducive, if 
it gets things right most of the time, or a large proportion of the time. This is more promising, 
as it vindicates the idea that we have a lot of knowledge, and doesn’t render most of our talk 
and thought about knowledge mistaken. It also explains how we can know things from our 
perceptual faculties despite the fact that they sometimes mislead us, and from teachers, books 
and testimony despite the fact that sometimes we form false beliefs via such methods.  
 
Once we take this second route, however, and allow that the belief-forming method need not 
be entirely reliable a new problem develops. Take a belief formed by a method that is 
sufficiently reliable for knowledge and fulfils the other conditions required by agent 
reliabilism. Suppose, Roddy the shepherd looks at a sheep-shaped object in normal daytime 
lighting across a field. As a shepherd with keen eyesight, Roddy is very reliable at 
recognising sheep, and fields are where sheep hang out, so his belief is well-justified. 
Roddy’s eyesight and sheep-recognition abilities are a well-integrated, stable part of his 
cognitive character, and he was responsibly aiming to form a true belief. Roddy accordingly 
forms the belief ‘there is a sheep in that part of the field’. But in this instance what he is 
looking at is not a sheep but a sheep-shaped rock. His reliable belief-forming process this 
time leads him to a false belief. Unbeknownst to him, behind the rock a sheep is grazing. His 
belief is therefore both true and formed by a reliable method. It fulfils the conditions laid out 
by both process reliabilism and agent reliabilism, yet it is not knowledge. The belief is too 
lucky.53  
 
Recall that Gettier cases have a general structure. The belief is well formed, but there is some 
bad luck such that ordinarily the belief would be false in this case. But a second piece of luck 
‘cancels out’ the first, so that the belief is true after all, in a way disconnected from the 
belief’s being well formed. Once we realise that this is the general structure of Gettier cases, 
constructing them becomes easy, in fact for process and agent reliabilism we have a simple 
recipe: Take a belief that is formed via a method reliable enough to satisfy the reliability 
requirement for knowledge. Then add some bad luck such that the belief would normally end 
up false (it’s a rock that Roddy has spotted), but then add some good luck so that the belief is 
in fact true (there is a sheep behind the rock).54   
 
                                                
53 The sheep case was first introduce by Chisholm (1977:105).  
54 A similar recipe can be produced for many theories of justification and knowledge. See 
Zagzebski (1996: 291f). 
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This mismatch between theory and intuitive extension in Gettier cases is a problem for 
process and agent reliabilism. And the fact that the counterexamples can be generated 
according to a recipe suggests that Gettier cases are getting at a fundamental weakness in the 
view. In light of Gettier cases, process and agent reliabilism have three paths available. The 
first is to claim that the subjects in these Gettier cases know, despite our intuitions to the 
contrary, and so Gettier cases are not a threat to the account of knowledge. This is an 
unpalatable route, as our intuitions about the intension strongly suggest that the agent doesn’t 
know in this case. Also, holding that the agent knows in this case is at odds with the anti-luck 
platitude, as is a paradigmatic case of veritic luck.55 An alternative route is to hold that 
although the agent doesn’t know in these cases, they are unimportant and marginal and so we 
need not amend the view in the light of the mismatch between theory and intuition. This 
approach too is costly. Firstly Gettier cases are not merely within the realm of fantasy – 
Gettier cases do occur.56 Secondly although they are often constructed exotically, their 
systemacity and simplicity suggests that they are tapping into an important and central, rather 
than a bizarre and so ignorable, feature of knowledge. Thirdly Gettier cases can affect many 
different kinds of knowledge – knowledge from perception, testimony, memory, reasoning 
etc – and they afflict many different accounts of knowledge. This suggests that Gettier cases 
are something to be reckoned with rather than dismissed.  
 
The third route available to reliabilists is to amend the view in light of the Gettier challenge.57 
They could augment the agent reliabilist conditions with other conditions, such as safety or a 
brute anti-Gettier condition. This move leads to the modest virtue epistemology mentioned 
above. Alternatively they can try and stay within the agent reliabilist framework but ‘beef up’ 
the conditions of agent reliabilism. The aim is to make the conditions less permissive and so 





                                                
55 Veritic luck occurs when, given how the belief was formed, it is only by luck that it is true. 
(See section 1.3).   
56 My favourite case being my husband’s belief, held on Dec 31st 2009, that he would get 
married in 2010. 
57 An alternative option available to the agent reliabilist is to contend that Roddy and other 
Gettier victims are not producing their beliefs via a reliable method. Thus the cases are not 
counterexamples to reliabilism because they do not fulfil the conditions. However, this is an 
unattractive option as it stands, because it claims that a reliable belief-forming process can 
never generate a false belief. This is because, recall, all that we needed to set up a Gettier 
case was a small gap in belief-forming process so that it was slightly unreliable. 
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2.4 A New Account of Knowledge: Robust Virtue Epistemology 
 
One fruitful diagnosis of Gettier cases is that whilst beliefs like Roddy the shepherd’s are 
both true and formed with ability, they are not true because well-formed. This understanding 
of Gettier cases suggests an important modification of the view: the addition of a causal 
relation between the belief’s being formed with ability and the belief’s being true. 58  Here are 
some typical statements of the position:  
 
Sosa writes:  
Knowledge is true belief out of intellectual virtue, belief that turns out right by reason 
of virtue and not just by coincidence. 59  
 
Zagzebski writes:   
Knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual 
virtue.60 
 
Riggs writes:  
[In cases of knowledge] the person derives epistemic credit… that she would not be 
due had she only accidentally happened upon a true belief… The difference… here is 
the variation to which a person’s abilities, powers and skills are causally responsible 
for the outcome, believing truly that p.61 
 
Greco writes:  
When we say that S knows p, we imply that it is not just an accident that S believes the 
truth with respect to p.  On the contrary, we mean to say that S gets things right with 
respect to p because S has reasoned in an appropriate way, or perceived things 
accurately, or remembered things well, etc.  We mean to say that getting it right can be 
                                                
58 In Greco (2003a: 19-21) Greco makes explicit that change from holding the conjunction (a 
belief must be true and formed with virtue) to the causal relation (a belief must be true 
because formed with virtue), allowed the switch from giving a partial account of knowledge 
to giving a fully fledged account of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. 
59 Sosa (1991: 277). 
60 Zagzebski (1996: 298). It is clear from context that by ‘arising’ she means that the 
cognitive contact is because of the intellectual virtue. Elsewhere Zagzebski writes, ‘It is 
important that success in reaching the end is due to the other praiseworthy features of the act. 
The end must be reached because of these other features… [in cases of knowledge the agent] 
is successful in reaching the truth because of these other features [that make the act 
virtuous].’ Zagzebski (1999: 107). 
61 Riggs (2002: 93-94). 
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put down to S’s own abilities, rather than to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something 
else. [Emphasis mine] 62 
 
All such views share the idea that in cases of knowledge the belief turns out correct by the 
manifestation of virtue (rather than by luck), and so in some way the agent caused, or played 
some appropriate role in producing, the truth of the belief. Furthermore, no other additional 
conditions are required to capture the nature of knowledge. This view is known as ‘robust 
virtue epistemology’ and can be summarised thus:  
 
Robust Virtue Epistemology: S knows that p iff S’s belief that p is true because it 
was formed with cognitive virtue.   
 
This suggestion holds a great deal of promise. In a standard case of knowledge, when a 
shepherd looks at a sheep in a field and forms the belief ‘there is a sheep in that field’, his 
abilities are part of the cause of the belief’s truth. In general what distinguishes knowledge 
from lesser epistemic standings such as mere lucky guesses or gullibly held beliefs is that in 
cases of knowledge the agent’s cognitive character ensures that the belief is true. By 
proposing this causal relation between the agent’s abilities and the fact that the belief is true, 
this account deals with Gettier cases such as Roddy the shepherd. This is because Roddy 
does not fulfil the conditions of RVE. His belief is formed with ability, but it isn’t true 
because it was formed with ability. It was true through luck. 
 
In addition to getting the extension right in such cases, robust virtue epistemology has many 
other strengths.63 Firstly it performs well at the ability platitude. By characterising knowledge 
as true belief through cognitive ability, it vindicates the first strand of the platitude: that 
knowledge is the product of ability and that knowledge is attributable to the agent. Since in 
order to know the agent must possess and engage the appropriate abilities, robust virtue 
epistemology also explains the second strand: why knowledge attributions tend to say 
something good about the agent.  
 
This suggestion also vindicates the anti-luck platitude. If the agent’s cognitive character 
causes fact that the belief is true, then belief isn’t true because of luck. We shall be returning 
                                                
62 Greco (2003a: 116).  
63 For other advantages of RVE, including that it can handle problems that plague internalist 
and deontological approaches to epistemic normativity see Greco (2010: especially ch. 2 and 
3).  
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to this claim, as a keystone in the defence of robust virtue epistemology is that its virtue-
theoretic conditions rule out cases of luck without recourse to a distinct anti-luck condition.  
 
Similarly robust virtue epistemology bodes well for the anti-sceptical platitude: it makes 
knowledge the kind of thing we can have. We will need to examine specific variants of RVE 
before we know that it fulfils the anti-luck platitude, as a virtue theory with a very restrictive 
account of ability may result in scepticism, but for now the suggestion looks promising as an 
anti-sceptical account of knowledge. 
 
The thesis also coheres well with some proposed genealogies of the concept of knowledge. 
Craig suggests, for example, that the purpose of the concept of knowledge is to tag good 
informants. If this is right then robust virtue epistemology, which focuses on the evaluable 
properties of agents (rather than the properties of beliefs or belief-forming methods) is a 
promising suggestion. If Craig is correct then we should expect knowledge-relevant 
epistemic evaluation to focus on the agent (rather than, say, modal properties of beliefs). By 
seating epistemic normativity in the agent’s cognitive character, RVE does just that.64 
 
RVE also has the virtue of being an elegant view with a simple structure. It also coheres well 
with other familiar concepts. True belief through cognitive ability is an instance of success 
through ability and so RVE construes knowledge as an instance of a more general kind. 
Success through ability is also an achievement and so according to RVE knowledge is a kind 
of achievement.65 In section 2.5 I explain in more depth the structure of RVE, by describing 
the schemas that Sosa and Greco advocate.   
 
By construing knowledge as a kind of achievement, RVE makes available a unique and 
promising suggestion for the value platitude. If achievements are a kind of thing we value 
finally (that is, for its own sake) and knowledge is a species of achievement, then knowledge 
is finally valuable:66  
 
(P1) Achievements are successes that are because of ability (Achievement  
thesis);  
(P2) knowledge is a cognitive success that is because of cognitive ability  
(Robust Virtue Epistemology);  
(C1) so, knowledge is a cognitive achievement (KA thesis);  
                                                
64 A similar suggestion is attributed to a Greco 1995 typescript in Kvanvig (2003: 83-86). 
65 That knowledge was an achievement in this regard was first suggested in Greco (2009). 
66 I have taken this argument from Pritchard (2010: 31). 
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(P3) achievements are finally valuable (Value of Achievements thesis);  
(C2) so, knowledge has final value.  
 
Detractors have questioned all three premises of this argument. In section 5.5 I briefly 
explore premise one (I suggest that even if premise one is false, robust virtue epistemology 
has resources to explain the value of knowledge through a related idea). I spend much of 
chapters four and five defending premise two. In section 2.6 I introduce Pritchard’s attack on 
premise two, which has the form of an apparent dilemma. The dilemma challenges the robust 
virtue epistemology thesis that S knows that p iff S’s belief that p is true because of the 
exercise of S’s cognitive ability.  
 
I argue that whilst this dilemma may succeed in undermining other accounts of robust virtue 
epistemology, the account I advocate does not fall victim to Pritchard’s dilemma. I thus 
defend the view that knowledge is success that is through cognitive ability. My defence of 
RVE against the apparent dilemma focuses largely on the through relation that obtains in 
cases of knowledge. This relation is of central importance in understanding knowledge; it has 
been the Achilles’ heel of orthodox RVE accounts. In order to highlight the importance of 
this through relation, I shall first say more about the structure of RVE.  
 
2.5 Schemas of RVE  
 
The thesis that knowledge is true belief formed through cognitive virtue has been defended 
prominently by Sosa and Greco.67 I will now explain their versions of the view. These are not 
complete accounts of knowledge. Different accounts of virtues, success, and the ‘through’ 
relationship can be applied to the schemas given in the next two sections to yield different 
accounts of knowledge. These schematic versions will be a useful aid as we explore the 
through relation, as we can see how the different accounts of through flesh out the position in 
different ways. 
 
a.) Sosa’s View: AAA 
Sosa first suggested that knowledge is a kind of success from ability in 1988, and the most 
comprehensive explication of his view is found in A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and 
                                                
67 The most comprehensive formulation of Greco’s view is found in Greco (2010), although 
he has given a more recent refinement of his view (Greco (m/s). The most comprehensive 
recent formulation of Sosa’s view is found in Sosa (2007).  
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Reflective Knowledge.68 His advocacy of robust virtue epistemology is motivated by 
consideration of the value platitude,69 but he also contends that the RVE structure he 
advocates can handle many Gettier cases, and that it deals with the spectre of scepticism. 
Sosa notes that activities with an aim – performances70 – can be assessed along three 
dimensions. Firstly, is it accurate – does it succeed in its aim. Secondly, is it adroit – was it 
skillfully done; does the performance manifest skill on the part of the agent. Thirdly, is the 
performance apt – is it successful because it is skilful; accurate because adroit? He calls this 
the AAA structure of assessing performances.71 
 
Sosa illustrates these dimensions of evaluation with the example of an archer taking a shot at 
a target. He notes that a shot can be accurate without being adroit. The shot could have been 
fired poorly by an inexperienced archer and so not be directed on course, for example, but a 
lucky gust of wind could direct the arrow so that it hits the target. In this case the shot doesn’t 
manifest skill. A shot can also be both accurate (hitting the target) and adroit (skilfully done) 
without being accurate because adroit. For example, the shot could be fired such that it is on 
the right course (it is adroit), but then a freak gust of wind knocks it off course. By chance a 
second freak gust of wind knocks it back on course and it hits a bull’s eye (it is accurate). In 
this case the shot manifests adroitness and is accurate. The accuracy itself, however, does not 
manifest adroitness. It is not accurate because it was skilful, rather it is accurate through luck. 
Finally a shot can be apt, that is accurate because adroit. An example is an arrow which hits 
the target because it was fired with skill.72 In this case, Sosa contends, both the shot and the 
success manifest the adroitness.73 Furthermore, Sosa suggests, a shot which (though accurate 
                                                
68 See Sosa (2007: especially ch. 2 and 5) for his account of knowledge. See also Sosa 
(2009). 
69 Sosa’s 2007 book is centred around looking at the nature of epistemic evaluation and 
epistemic normativity as a response to the sceptical challenge. Sosa himself appears to 
advocate an unusual view of epistemic normativity, where it is hypothetical rather than 
categorical. He suggests that we evaluate epistemic value relative to epistemic aims, but he 
says relatively little about whether these aims are actually good, when considered from 
outside the domain of our epistemic aims. When talking about good beliefs he gives 
analogies to good coffee and good archery (which are usually taken to be hypothetical goods) 
rather than to morality (categorical goods). Pritchard has pointed out to me that Sosa’s view 
amounts to holding that judging something is epistemically valuable does not entail that it is 
both epistemic and valuable, but only that it has epistemic value. To use Geach’s terms, 
epistemic value is attributive rather than predicative. Geach (1956:33). 
70 Sosa is permissive about what counts as a performance, and includes activities that don’t 
have an end point. Sosa (2007:23). 
71 Sosa (2007: 22-23). 
72 Sosa (2007: 79; 2009:9). 
73 Note that in section 3.3 I explain that accurate because skilful does not quite amount to the 
success manifesting the skill. I suggest that the latter is closer to Sosa’s view. However, such 
details do not need worry us here.  
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and adroit) fails to be apt is not as valuable as a shot which is apt, for an apt shot is creditable 
to the agent, and this is a kind of thing that we value.74 Although not expressed explicitly by 
Sosa, many have added that when a performance is apt, then it is an achievement.75  
 
Having set up this general structure for evaluating performances, he applies the structure to 
beliefs. Beliefs can be accurate (true76), adroit (formed with competence), and apt (true 
because competently formed). Knowledge, Sosa holds, is apt belief.77  
 
Clearly this view needs to be filled in more before it can be properly evaluated, but it is 
useful to lay out the schematic structure. We shall be returning in more detail to Sosa’s view 
of the through relation in section 3.3, but for now we turn to an alternative schema of the 
virtue theory of knowledge, one which provides slightly more detail about the abilities that 
count towards knowledge-relevant epistemic evaluation. 
 
b.) Greco’s view: true because virtuous  
 
Greco uses as a starting point for his schema of knowledge that virtues have a reliabilist and a 
motivational component. Using an Aristotelian notion of virtue, he argues that in order to be 
virtuous one needs to have both responsibility for one’s conduct and reliability in achieving 
one’s ends. He applies these ideas about virtue to the epistemic domain.78 
 
He defines knowledge-relevant responsibility as:  
 
Resp: S’s belief that p is epistemically responsible iff S’s believing that p is properly 
motivated; iff S’s believing that p results from intellectual dispositions that S manifests 
when S is motivated to believe the truth.  
 
He defines knowledge-relevant reliability as:  
 
Rel:  S is objectively reliable in believing that p iff S’s believing that p results from 
intellectual dispositions that reliably produce a true belief. 
 
                                                
74 For an argument that we value aptness see (Sosa: 2007: 75-76; 87-88). See also section 5.5.  
75For example Pritchard (2009b).  
76 Audi suggests that we should expand what we mean by knowledge-relevant cognitive 
success to also include disbelief and withholding belief. Audi (2004). 
77 Sosa (2007: 24). 
78 The following definitions are from Greco (2010: 43-45). 
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He then defines epistemic virtue as when the agent possesses the conjunction of the 
responsibility and the reliability components. He also uses the term ‘able’ to describe an 
agent satisfying this conjunction.  
 
EV. S’s belief is epistemically virtuous iff both a.) S’s belief that p is epistemically 
responsible; and b.) S is objectively reliable in believing that p.   
 
Greco then notes that whilst epistemic responsibility and reliability in belief formation are 
good things about an agent, it is even better if these qualities in the agent’s epistemic 
practises lead to success. It is better if the belief is true because it was reliably and 
responsibly formed.79 He thus defines the normativity of knowledge in a similar way to Sosa, 
where the through relation is key to reaching the epistemic standing of knowledge:80 
 
EN. S’s belief that p has knowledge-relevant normative status (it has all the normative 
properties that knowledge requires) iff S’s believes the truth because S’s belief is 
epistemically virtuous.  
 
He then makes the stronger claim that this account is not merely of the knowledge-relevant 
normativity, but in fact wholly captures the structure of knowledge: 
 
Greco’s schema: S’s knows that p iff S’s believes the truth regarding p because S’s 
belief is epistemically virtuous.  
 
Like Sosa, Greco distinguishes between having the conjunction of ability and success (the 
belief being formed with ability and the belief being true), and having success because of 
                                                
79 Greco (2010: 44). For Greco on the special value engendered by the ‘because’ relation 
(rather than mere conjunction), see also (Greco: 97-101).  
80 Zagzebski expresses a very similar view of the structure of knowledge, except that in 
Zagzebski’s account reliability plays a less important role. In Zagzebski’s account knowledge 
is an act of virtue. Zagzebski (1996: 271). She writes: ‘An act of virtue not only is motivated 
by the particular virtue and expresses the agent’s possession of the motivational component 
of the virtue but is successful in reaching both the immediate and the ultimate aim of that 
virtue, which is to say, it must lead to truth because of the operation of that virtue.’ Zagzebski 
(1996: 269). Zagzebski believes that an act of virtue (unlike a virtuous act) can emanate from 
someone who herself is not virtuous, but i.) aspires to be, and ii.) acts as the virtuous person 
would. What may be lacking is reliability in bringing about the end (reliability being a 
prerequisite for possessing a virtue and therefore orchestrating a virtuous act; but possessing 
the virtue (according to Zagzebski) isn’t necessary for performing an act of virtue). This 
solves puzzles such as how children can know even though they are not yet reliable believers 
and therefore epistemically virtuous. [Zagzebski (1996:279)]. I believe that for Greco this 
would correspond to someone having knowledge who was not able (virtuous). Given his 
schema of RVE I believe that he would not endorse this. 
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ability (the belief being true because it is formed with ability). The latter, he contends, is 
knowledge.81  Thus he endorses the RVE account of knowledge.  
 
3.6 A Dilemma for Robust Virtue Epistemology 
 
Thus we have reached the view that S knows that p iff S’s belief that p is true because 
virtuously formed. The details have yet to be filled in, but even as a schema of knowledge the 
account is vulnerable to criticism. One takes the form of a dilemma and is pressed 
(separately) by Lackey and Pritchard. This criticism highlights the importance of the 
‘through’ relation that shall be the focus of chapters three and five.82  
 
The dilemma is best illustrated with two putative counterexamples, which appear to pull 
RVE in conflicting directions.83 Attempts to save the view from one line of objection, hold 
Pritchard and Lackey, make the view more susceptible to the other line. I refer to the the first 
putative counterexample as the simple testimony case: 84 
 
Having just arrived at the train station in Chicago, Morris wishes to obtain directions to the 
Sears Tower. He looks around, approaches the first adult passer-by that he sees, and asks 
how to get to his desired destination. The passer-by, who happens to be a Chicago resident 
who knows the city extraordinarily well, provides Morris with impeccable directions to the 
Sears Tower by telling him that it is located two blocks east of the train station. Morris 
unhesitatingly forms the corresponding true belief. 
  
This is a fairly mundane case of testimony and we judge that Morris knows in this case. It is 
certainly costly to deny that Morris knows,85 because such enquiries and resultant beliefs 
                                                
81 Note that Greco’s account makes explicit how virtue epistemology can bring together 
strands from externalist (the reliability requirement) and internalist (the motivation 
requirement) thought. See Greco (2010: 42-46).  
82 This dilemma can be found in Lackey (2007; 2009); Pritchard (2007b; 2007d; 2008a; 
2008b; 2009b; 2010; m/s). A discussion of it is also found in Greco (m/s). 
83 Note that this case was originally devised as a counterexample to the Credit Thesis. This is 
the view, defended most explicitly by Riggs, but also in various guises by Greco, Sosa, and 
Zagzebski, holds that the difference between knowledge and mere true belief is when the 
agent deserves some epistemic credit (roughly construed as praise) for the truth of her belief. 
I shall be using the counterexample here as a counterexample to RVE, not the Credit Thesis. 
When Lackey posed this dilemma in her 2007 paper she used standard Gettier type cases. 
Pritchard and Lackey have since pressed the dilemma using BFC-style Gettier cases. This is 
how I shall formulate the dilemma, because I believe it is a more challenging version of the 
dilemma for RVE.  
84 Lackey (2007: 352). 
85 Some people do take this route. See for example Fricker (1995). 
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occur all the time, and much of what we usually consider knowledge is gained via such 
exchanges. Denying that Morris knows would reduce a lot of what we had considered 
knowledge to some lesser epistemic standing, and would render much of our intuitive 
knowledge attributions inaccurate and our language use incorrect. It also breaks widely held 
normative links between knowledge and rational action to claim that Morris doesn’t know: 
we judge that a tourist is rational to start walking in the direction indicated, but if he doesn’t 
know then this puts pressure on the knowledge-action norm.  
 
But it is hard to see how this case satisfies the schema of RVE. The true belief is not due to 
S’s abilities, but rather it is due to someone else’s abilities: the testifier’s. The truth of the 
belief is attributable to the informant, not to Morris. Insofar as it is an achievement that 
Morris came to have a true belief, it is not Morris’s.86 
 
One natural response to this counterexample is to make the conditions of robust virtue 
epistemology more permissive. This amendment holds that in order to fulfil the conditions 
laid out by the schema of RVE, the agent’s role need not be the most important causal factor 
in coming to have a true belief; it is enough that the agent’s abilities are one factor of many. 
The account holds that it is consistent with the agent’s knowing that p that the agent’s role in 
forming the true belief that p is augmented with other things, such as testimony from other 
people. This amendment handles the simple testimony case, because even if he does not play 
the most important role, Morris plays some important role in his coming to have a true belief 
about the location of the Sears Tower, and so he fulfils these weaker conditions on RVE.  
 
This amendment also has the virtue of capturing that we are frequently aided by other things 
– testifiers, teachers, books, instruments, calculators etc – and that the presence of such aids 
doesn’t impede the acquisition of knowledge. Thus it seems that the modified view better 
reflects our epistemic world.87  
 
But this weakening of RVE creates other problems for the view. In particular, cases which 
are not intuitively cases of knowledge fulfil the weakened conditions. This is the second horn 
                                                
86 Different versions of RVE will characterise the problem in slightly different ways. I 
examine these different accounts later, but for now I hope to describe the terrain using vague 
or ecumenical expressions. 
87 I return to this point (sections 3.2 and 2.5), and argue that such augmenting features not 
only don’t weaken our epistemic standing, they can also strengthen it, and this strongly 
suggests that salience accounts and primitivist accounts of the through relation (as described 
in sections 3.1 and 3.2) will not capture the nature of knowledge. 
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of the apparent dilemma. Consider the following case, which I shall refer to as the barn 
façade county case:88 
 
Barney is driving through the countryside and he spots a barn. He forms the corresponding 
belief, ‘there is a barn in that field’. His eyesight is working fine, the light is clear, and he 
certainly has the capacity to distinguish barns from, say, houses and combine harvesters. In 
usual cases we would say that this is a case of knowledge. But unbeknownst to Barney the 
countryside has recently been used to film a period drama, and is currently dotted with fake 
barns: objects that resemble the one he is looking at, but are mere two dimensional copies. 
Had Barney seen any of those, rather than the one real barn, he would also have formed a 
belief ‘there is a barn in that field’ but his belief would have been false.  
 
In this case we judge that Barney’s belief is too lucky to be knowledge; he could so easily 
have been wrong. But Barney’s eyesight was functioning well, and he competently formed a 
true belief that a barn was present as a result of looking at a real barn. The case is not like 
Roddy the shepherd, who believed he was looking at a sheep but was in fact looking at a 
rock: Barney didn’t make a mistake about what he was looking at. Unlike standard Gettier 
cases, where luck intervenes between the belief and the fact, in this case of the luckiness of 
the belief lies in the nature of the environment. This is a case of environmental luck: given 
that the environment is so unfriendly, it is only by luck that his belief is true.   
 
Furthermore, Barney’s eyesight and barn-recognition faculties are an important part of the 
story about how he came to have a true belief about the presence of the barn. Barney thus 
satisfies the proposed weakened conditions of RVE: his cognitive character and the exercise 
of his abilities were important in how he came to form a true belief about the presence of the 
barn. 
 
The theorist might respond that although Barney plays a large role in why his belief is true, 
the most significant factor in this case is luck: were he to have been looking at any other 
barn-shaped structures in the area he would have formed a false belief. By chance he was 
looking at the one real barn. But using this insight to adjust RVE does not hold much promise 
when we reconsider the testimony case. If in cases of knowledge the agent must play the 
largest role, thus explaining why Barney doesn’t know, it is not clear how such a view will 
deal with testimony, where it seems the largest role is the informant’s. 
 
                                                
88 Case by Carl Ginet, cited by Alvin Goldman. Goldman (1992: 102; 1976). 
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Thus the two cases appear to pull the theory in opposing directions. One can deal with the 
testimony case by weakening the condition required by the through clause. With this 
refinement the agent can be one of many causes of her true belief, such as in a case of 
testimony, but this comes at the expense of making the problem of the barn façade county 
case more intractable. In this case Barney’s abilities play an important causal role, and so he 
fulfils the weaker conditions of RVE, yet intuitively Barney doesn’t know.  
 
As I shall argue, it is a mistake for a defender of RVE to accept that this is a genuine 
dilemma. If this were the right way to view the problem, then a proponent of the view must 
refine RVE in the same place to deal with the two challenges. I shall argue that such an 
approach is hopeless, and that the best way to defuse the challenge to RVE is to show that 
this is a false dilemma. As the Lackey/Pritchard challenge effectively raises the question of 
the nature of the through relation, and as any account of knowledge along the lines of the 
schemas in sections 2.5 is incomplete without a thorough account of this relation, I shall now 
look at various attempts to elucidate it. From my exploration I hope to use the weaknesses 
and strengths I find in existing views to guide my own theorising about the through relation. 
Thus I will work towards building my own account of knowledge in chapter five.  
 
 




The first suggestion is that the through relation is epistemically primitive. This approach 
holds that we have a good intuitive access to when the relation obtains,89 and that it is 
mistake to try and give further conditions for capturing it. Something’s being because of 
something else is an everyday occurrence with which we are conceptually fluent. Rather than 
trying to analyse the nature of the through relation, the most we can do is ask about whether 
the through relation obtains in specific instances. The view holds that whenever we intuit that 
the belief is true through the agent’s abilities (whenever we intuit that the RVE through 
relation holds), it is a case of knowledge.90  
                                                
89 This claim is importantly different from the claim that we have intuitive access to the 
nature of the though relation. The primitivist view does not hold that we have this. 
90 This position hasn’t been thoroughly staked out in the literature, so I have embellished a 
view that is inspired by Zagzebski. The following features are explicitly endorsed by 
Zagzebski: that the through relation is something we have intuitive access to, that we should 
distinguish between ‘believed because’ and ‘true because’ and that only the latter is 
knowledge relevant, and that we make judgements about when the through relation obtains in 
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A theorist might be attracted to this primitivist suggestion if, for example, they think that 
causal concepts in general are primitive (such that they cannot be analysed without essential 
use of other causal concepts). If the ‘through’ of RVE is an instance of a causal concept, and 
we cannot reduce causal concepts to non-causal ones, then this suggests that we cannot give a 
reductive account of the through relation in RVE.91 
 
Zagzebski develops this sort of primitivist account of the through relation. She notes the 
distinction between reasons why the belief is true (rather than false) and reasons why the 
belief is held (rather than not believed or having different content).92 To see this distinction in 
play consider the barn façade county case: if we ask why he formed the belief, the answer is 
his eyesight and barn-recognition abilities. If we ask why the belief that he formed is true, it 
is more plausible to answer that the belief is true through luck (because if he was looking at 
any other structure he would have formed a false belief). Zagzebski holds that our access to 
the through relation is often guided by counterfactual reasoning, and the two questions (why 
does the agent have the belief, and why is the belief true) lead to different counterfactual 
results, and hence to different intuitive responses about the through relation. Zagzebski notes 
that only the latter is relevant to the account of knowledge: in cases of knowledge the belief 
is true (rather than false) through the abilities of the agent. 
 
Zagzebski holds that although we often arrive at judgements about when the through relation 
obtains by using modal claims as a heuristic, this is not the same as the through relation being 
metaphysically reduceable to the counterfactuals. That we judge the relation’s obtaining 
using sensitivity relations is not the same as the through being sensitivity relations.93 This is 
important for Zagzebski’s view of knowledge, because if the through relation merely 
amounts to modal conditions, then it is unclear why her view does not reduce to positing an 
explicit modal condition on knowledge. If this were her view, then it loses its RVE 
credentials and no longer construes knowledge as an act of virtue. When Zagzebski defends 
                                                                                                                                      
part by judgements about sensitivity. (See Zagzebski 1999; 1996). However, the part about it 
being a mistake to try and analyse it further is not a claim she makes explicitly. In Zagzebski 
(1999: 108, 111-2) she writes ‘the concept of reaching A because of B is a key element of the 
definition. We all have intuitions about what it means for something to happen because of 
something else, but this concept is in need of further analysis and I do not know of one that is 
adequate.’ This suggests that she could not endorse the claim that we ought not to analyse the 
relation further.  
91 Compare Scriven (1966) ‘The concept of cause is fundamental to our conception of the 
world in much the same way as the concept of number: we cannot define it in terms of other 
notions without conceptual or ostensive circularity’ Scriven (1966) p.258. 
92 This distinction is in Zagzebski (1996 p.297) and Sosa (2007: 96-7).  
93 Zagzebski (1999). 
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the claim that the through relation doesn’t reduce to modal conditions she cites as evidence 
that through relations among analytic truths cannot be analysed using sensitivity (because 
analytic truths are true in all possible worlds). But this is not an adequate defence of her 
thesis because it only deals with such a small range of cases and, as Pritchard notes, the cases 
that we are interested in do not concern analytic truths. This has prompted Pritchard, and 
others, to object that her through relation amounts to a modal condition, and so she doesn’t 
present a distinctly RVE account of knowledge.94  
 
But although Zagzebski’s defence of her position is inadequate, Pritchard’s conclusion comes 
too fast. Modal relations may be treated as heuristics for when the through relation holds, but 
other factors also matter when forming our intuitive judgements. In other words, the intuitive 
through relation doesn’t not merely amount to whether sensitivity relations obtain. In 
particular, we can have two factors that have strong modal correlations but where we do not 
thereby judge that a through relation holds. Cases of common causes are like this, for 
example. Suppose that whenever I blow my whistle this causes my keys to beep, and blowing 
the same whistle also causes my dog to heel. Assuming that nothing else causes my keys to 
beep or my dog to heel, and they both respond reliably to my whistle, the counterfactual 
correlations between my dog’s heeling and the keys beeping hold. In nearby worlds where 
one occurs the other occurs. Yet this does not mean that the dog’s heeling is through the 
key’s beeping. Additionally in the Rene the Gambler case the agent’s beliefs are safe (he 
cannot easily form a false belief), and in the Brain Lesion case the agent’s belief are sensitive 
(whenever the agent has the brain lesion then he believes it), yet in neither case do we 
thereby intuit that the through relation holds (such that the agent’s belief is true through the 
exercise of her cognitive character). These two cases serve to drive a wedge between the 
primitivist’s through relation and the modal conditions. Thus we ought conclude that whilst 
the through relation may be guided by the modal relations, it does not amount to them. This 
means that, contra Pritchard, Zagzebski’s view is a form of robust virtue epistemology and 
does not amount to positing sensitivity conditions on knowledge. 
 
The primitivist approach is initially appealing. First it captures something of the 
phenomenology of the through relation. When we are presented with a case, we have a 
‘seeing’, or judging, of something’s being through something else. It is such an everyday 
occurrence that it seems as though we have a special capacity for it. 
 
                                                
94 Pritchard (2005: 197). 
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Secondly this approach has the virtue getting a great deal of central cases right, including 
Gettier cases: we can ‘see’ that the true belief is through luck in the Roddy the shepherd case. 
We would not, with our basic intuitive judgements about the through relation, judge that it 
was through skill, eyesight etc that he came to have a true belief. In contrast, when we 
consider the usual case of when a shepherd looks across a field, sees a sheep and forms the 
corresponding belief that there is a sheep in the field, we judge that this time it is through the 
abilities of the agent that he forms a true belief. Thus the primitivist theory matches the 
intuition in these cases.  
 
The primitivist view performs well at the barn façade county case. When presented with this 
case we judge that the belief is true through luck, not through the agent’s abilities. And the 
reason why we judge it is not knowledge accords with the reason why we judge it is not 
through the abilities of the agent. That is, when we reflect on the luckiness of the truth of the 
belief this makes us more likely to judge both that it isn’t known, and that through relation, 
conceived as primitive and intuitive, doesn’t hold. This adds some support for thinking that 
an ‘intuitive’ basis for this relation is a good way to capture instances of knowledge.  
 
The claim that the through relation is something that defies analysis may accord well with a 
Craigian approach to knowledge. In contrast to the traditional project of trying to provide an 
account that renders knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient constituent conditions, 
Craig claims that we should instead study the concept of knowledge by looking at the 
function it has played, and use those insights to guide our theorising about the contemporary 
concept of knowledge.95 He argues that such a ‘function first’ approach will recommend 
abandoning the attempt to analyse the concept into necessary and sufficient conditions that 
match all its instances: the concept would have evolved with an unanalysable extension 
because this was the best way for the concept to fulfil its role. Perhaps the through relation is 
similar – it performs useful functions, but any attempt to analyse it into constituent parts, or 
to capture its extension with a short list of conditions, will fail because it doesn’t have a neat 
extension or cogent structure. If this is right about the through relation, this will support a 
similar view about knowledge as conceived with this RVE structure, and vice versa. The 
primitivist account fits with a Craigian approach because it refrains from offering full 
sufficient and necessary conditions, but instead posits only a sketch of the basic structure of 
knowledge.  
 
                                                
95 Craig (1990). 
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But this primitivist approach faces problems. The approach says that the through relation 
used in an account of knowledge is an intuitive notion and holds that whenever it seems that 
S’s abilities are the cause of why she has a true belief, then S knows. But there are many 
cases where our intuitive notion of whether the belief is true through the abilities of the agent 
doesn’t track whether the agent knows. Examples include when we learn something from a 
book – particularly when the book is easy to read and so doesn’t require much effort or skill 
on the part of the agent. Here our intuitive judgement is that the belief formed is true because 
of the accuracy of the book. Similarly where the agent used a calculator or Cha Cha,96 or 
could determine something only by using a telescope or thermometer. In all these cases it 
seems that we intuit that the belief is true through the aid, and not through the agent. Whilst 
we may recognise that the agent played a role, it is a stretch of our intuitive notion of through 
to hold that the belief is true through the agent.  
 
This conception of the through relation also doesn’t make any progress on the simple 
testimony case. The most natural and intuitive response to the testimony case is to report that 
the agent forms a true belief because of the abilities of the informant. It is a counterintuitive 
notion of ‘through’ to say that it is through Morris’s abilities that he comes to form a true 
belief, yet this is clearly a case of knowledge.  
 
As before we can say that the through relation can hold for more than one causal factor for 
any given event – whilst we cannot intuit that Morris was the cause, perhaps we can intuit 
that he was a cause. But this again puts pressure on the barn façade county case, as in this 
case Barney’s abilities were a cause, so the weakened account rules that this is a case of 
knowledge.  
 
The primitivist approach to the through relation also leads to cases that intuitively are not 
knowledge yet with our intuitive grasp of the through relation we judge that the truth of the 
belief is through the abilities of the agent. Consider the following case: Maud the 
mathematician is working on some complicated theorem. She has been sitting up for weeks, 
working alone in her study. In fact, her pride and intellectual ambition means that she hasn’t 
consulted other people; they don’t even know what she is working on. Finally she gets to the 
end of her working. ‘Bingo’, she thinks. Of course, she realises that she should check over 
the results and show them to her peers in the maths department before she can be sure, but 
she is so happy about it and confident in her abilities that she believes the results.  
 
                                                
96 Text Cha Cha a question and they text you back the answer.  
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In this case we strongly intuit that the resultant true belief is true through her ability. She was 
the only person working on the theorem. However, it is not a clear case of knowledge. 
Perhaps, given the difficulty of the project, she needs to check the results or appeal to peer 
review before it amounts to knowledge. Certainly we will be more inclined to attribute 
knowledge once she has gone to her colleagues to ask for verification of her results, and the 
more people and machines who verify it, the more clearly we attribute knowledge. But the 
more experts who verify the results, then the less the belief’s truth is through her own 
abilities. This is because more factors enter the causal nexus. Recall that we use sensitivity 
relations as a heuristic for causal factors, and these other people play a counterfactual role: 
were she to have had a false belief, this would have been picked up on by the experts. As 
more people verify the result, her role in why the belief is true stands out less. If her belief 
had been false, someone would have noticed it and she would have stopped believing falsely. 
 
This correlation is a problem for the primitivist view, which holds that the when the agent 
stands out in our intuitive ‘through’ attribution, we should intuit it as a case of knowledge. 
Reflecting on the mathematician case, however, reveals that sometimes when more factors 
play a causal role in the belief’s truth, the agent’s abilities stand out less, and yet we intuit 
more strongly that she knows.  
  
Additionally, this view suffers from another weakness, which is its lack of explanatory 
power. It does not seem to give us a principled way to divide when the true belief is through 
the agent from when it is through something else. Relying on brute intuitions about cases is 
not very enlightening.97  
 
In light of these weaknesses – that it can’t deal with cases of testimony, that our intuitive 
through relation doesn’t track knowledge attributions in many other cases, and that it lacks 
explanatory power – it makes sense to look for a different account of the through relation. 
But first, we should summarise what we have learnt from exploring the primitivist 
suggestion.  
 
Firstly, by focusing on whether the through relation holds we capture the intuitive extension 
of many cases of knowledge. When a shepherd looks at a real sheep, the belief is true through 
his abilities, and so is knowledge. When Roddy looks at a rock, behind which is a sheep, his 
belief is true through luck. Focusing on when the through relation holds (rather than, say, 
                                                
97 Greco makes a similar point in Greco (m/s: 9). 
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merely when the abilities are possessed) clearly get lots of cases right. This vindicates RVE’s 
addition of the causal relation.  
 
A large class of problems for the view occur when more than one thing cause the belief’s 
truth, especially when the role played by the agent seems insignificant compared to some 
other role and yet the agent clearly knows. This suggests that whilst it may be a good start to 
look at when a through relation obtains, it is a mistake to want only one thing to fill the X 
position of ‘X caused S’s belief regarding p to be true’ or to want the agent to be the most 
dominant factor in an explanation of the truth of the belief. Another insight, revealed by 
looking at the mathematician case, is that when more factors are making the belief true rather 
than false we may be more willing, rather than less willing, to attribute knowledge. I return to 
this point in section 5.2.  
 
3.2 Explanatory Salience 
 
Given the lack of explanatory power provided by the previous suggestion and the fact that it 
provides no principled way (apart from mere intuition) to determine when the through 
relation obtains, we may seek a more informative and systematic view. Greco provides just 
that. He offers perhaps the most developed account of the through relation in the literature.98 
He understands the through relation as an explanatory relation. He holds that in cases of 
knowledge, the fact that S’s belief about p is true is best explained by the fact that S believes 
from ability. In other words, in cases of knowledge, S’s abilities are salient in a causal 
explanation of how S comes to have a true belief that p.99 
 
To understand better the contours of this suggestion, we must look at the nature of causal 
explanation.100 First, Greco notes, many different factors are in the causal nexus that brings 
about an effect; and furthermore some causal factors are more important – more salient – 
than others in an explanation. Next he notes that causal explanations tend to pick out one 
factor as primary. He illustrates this with the case of the recent financial crisis, where we say 
                                                
98 One of his explicit aims in his project is to give a more systematic approach to Gettier 
cases – ‘a principled rationale’ for dividing up when the conditions of RVE hold and S 
believes the truth because S believes from an intellectual ability. Greco (2010:74). 
99 For details of Greco’s view see Greco (2003a; 2010). Although Greco is the most 
prominent defender of the explanatory understanding of the through relation, other authors 
frequently use the notion of explanation in their descriptions of cases. For example Sosa 
(2007: 96-97); Zagzebski (1996: 270 n.4). 
100 Greco’s account is highly influenced by Feinberg’s account of moral blame. See 
especially ‘Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals’, ‘Action and Responsiibility’ and 
‘Causing Voluntary Actions in Feinberg (1970).  
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that poor lending practises led to the crash. He notes that here, as is typical with causal 
explanations, we cite just one thing from a complicated causal nexus.101 
 
Greco notes that the mechanisms that determine which factor from a set of causal factors is 
picked out as primary are poorly understood, and that more work is needed for a full account. 
He draws our attention to two features of causal explanations.102 Firstly, causal explanations 
often cite what is atypical about a situation. If we take the case of a fire outbreak in a factory 
many things are in the causal nexus – the presence of oxygen, the flammable materials, a 
spark – but our causal explanations pick out the unusual feature. Perhaps the spark is what 
differed from the normal, so we say that the spark is the cause of the fire. In this case the 
spark is abnormal and so is the salient factor in our causal explanation. We can imagine an 
environment in which sparks are normal, however, whilst the presence of oxygen is not (say, 
a controlled environment within a science lab). In this case, with the same causal nexus, we 
are inclined to say that the presence of oxygen is the cause of the fire. This is because in this 
case oxygen is the abnormal feature. Secondly, our aims and interests affect what we judge to 
be the salient feature of a causal explanation – we pick out what we can adjust or control. To 
illustrate this he gives the example of a traffic accident: The traffic cop may blame speeding 
whilst the road planner blames the blindness of the bend.103 The difference is because each 
individual homes in on what they can control in their practical environment. The feature that 
they can manipulate is salient for them.104 105 Note that Greco intends his account of salience 
to be in accord with what naturally seems important to us in causal explanation; he doesn’t 
intend for his mechanisms of salience to depart radically from an intuitive notion of primary 
causation.106 
 
Greco claims that:  
In cases of knowledge, S believes the truth because S believes from intellectual ability 
– S’s believing the truth is explained by S’s believing from ability… [This] requires 
                                                
101 For Greco on explanatory salience see Greco (2010: 74-5, 104-8; 2004a: 242-245).   
102 Greco (2010: 74). 
103 These examples are found in Greco (2007b; 2008a; 2010). 
104 Note that this introduces attributer contextualism into causal explanations, and therefore 
knowedge attributions. However, it is not the standard ‘standards’ contextualism. See Greco 
(2008a; 2004a: 243f; 2010: ch. 7). For criticisms of this Greco’s contextualism see (Pritchard 
2008a) and section 3.2.  
105 Perhaps the abnormality feature of the mechanisms of salience is best described as 
epistemic criteria: it is about what can be expected. In contrast the ‘aims and interests’ 
criteria are pragmatic; they are a function of our practical environment, what we care about 
and can control, rather than what we know or expect.  
106 Greco (2010 83-4). 
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more than that ability is involved. It requires that S’s ability has an appropriate level of 
explanatory salience.107  
 
Greco holds that the agent’s intellectual abilities have ‘default salience’ in explanations of 
true belief and he contends that this is because of our aims and interests as information-
sharing beings. We are interested in tracking reliable epistemic agents so that we can identify 
who the good informants are, and this makes salient the epistemic performance of other 
agents.108 This means that in standard cases of knowledge, such as the simple testimony case, 
the agent enjoys a default salience in an explanation of why his belief is true. 
 
Greco’s suggestion is that in cases where something (such as luck) trumps the salience of the 
abilities in a causal explanation, the agent doesn’t know. But if the agent is the ‘overarching 
explanation’, or ‘salient enough’, then the agent knows. Greco claims that intuitions about 
whether S knows tend to vary with intuitions about whether the agent’s abilities are 
explanatorily salient.109  
 
This account offers a neat solution to standard Gettier problems. Owing to our interests and 
aims as social epistemic beings, in the straightforward (non-Gettiered) case where a shepherd 
looks at a sheep and so forms the corresponding true belief, the abilities of the agent are 
salient enough that the true belief is through the abilities of the shepherd. Thus the case 
fulfils the conditions, and entails that the shepherd knows. This is in accord with our intuition 
that he knows. Where Roddy the shepherd is the victim of a Gettier case, however, the 
double-luck is an unusual feature. Being an unusual feature, the luck is therefore the salient 
cause, rather than the agent. Roddy is deemed to not fulfil the conditions, and so not know. In 
Greco’s words,  
 
In the case of a deviant causal chain [between agent and her success], salience goes to 
what is deviant, and away from what is normal or usual… default salience is trumped 
                                                
107 Greco (2010 73, 75). Note that as stated here it is a necessity claim. It is clear from context 
he intends it as a sufficiency claim. See, for example, Greco (2010:71), and my section 2.5. 
108 Greco (2010: 73, 75). This explanation of why we focus on other epistemic agents is 
inspired by Craig. See Craig (1990).  
109 Greco (2010: 83-4). ‘We have no precise or systematic understanding of the rules 
governing explanatory salience… [but] intuitions about whether S knows tend to sway with 
intuitions about explanatory salience. That is, in cases were it seems that S knows, it seems 
that it is the case that S’s cognitive abilities are important in an explanation why S believes 
the truth. And in cases where it seems that S does not know, it seems that S’s abilities are less 
important in such an explanation. This would indicate that [the salience account] is correct, 
even if it is neither maximally specific not maximally informative.’ 
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by abnormality in Gettier cases… by the abnormality manifested in the way that S 
ends up with a true belief110  
 
Similarly it is available to Greco to hold that in the barn façade county case, the unusual 
environmental luck also trumps the default salient of the agent, so that even though nothing 
has come betwixt agent and fact in the causal chain, in the explanatory story, the luck takes 
centre stage. By his account of the mechanisms of salience, salience goes to what is 
abnormal, and the luck is an abnormal feature of the case. 
 
In fact, this account performs better at barn façade county case than the primitivist account 
outlined in section 3.1. This is because by employing the mechanisms of salience Greco 
provides more details about when the through relation obtains, and these mechanisms clearly 
rule that the environmental luck, being so unusual, is more salient than the agent. In contrast 
the primitivist account doesn’t provide a further guide about when the through relation 
obtains, and it is less clear that we brutely intuit that it is through luck rather than through 
ability that Barney comes to have a true belief in this case. His role is important (he is 
looking at a real barn, and is correctly identifying it as such), and so it is not clear whether it 
is more through luck or through ability that his belief is true. But Greco’s account can explain 
why it is not through the agent – the luck is more salient.111  
 
This approach is also more informative than the primitivist account. It gives us principles for 
determining when the through relation holds, and tells us more about its nature. 
 
If the through relation of robust virtue epistemology operates as Greco suggests, then the 
concept of knowledge coheres well with other important concepts. Explanatory relations 
where one salient factor is picked out are familiar and important. This was one of our criteria 
for evaluating competing accounts of knowledge. Greco also contends that his understanding 
of the through relation accommodates our contextualist intuitions.112  
 
                                                
110 Greco (2010: 75). See Greco (2003a: 21) ‘In cases of knowledge S’s reliable character has 
salience in an explanation of how S comes to get things right. In Gettier cases, S’s reliable 
character loses salience in favour of something else’. [emphasis mine].  
111 One might, however, argue that it is actually a virtue of the account if rules with less 
certainty on cases that are ‘peripheral’, as our intuitions about whether they are instances of 
knowledge waver in these cases. 
112 Greco (2007b; 2008a).  
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But this view faces problems.113 Firstly, understanding the through relation as explanatory 
salience makes no progress on the dilemma posed by the simple testimony and barn façade 
county cases. As we saw in section 3.1, reflecting on knowledge from testimony, books and 
apparatus suggests that any view where in cases of knowledge the agent must be the most 
important factor in why their belief is true is, for that reason, misguided. To solve this 
problem by reducing the requisite importance of the agent’s role, so that the agent can be just 
one factor of many opens the possibility that the victims of some Gettier cases fulfil the 
proposed conditions. The account is still being pulled in these two different directions.  
 
Secondly it is not clear that Greco adequately explains why the recipient of testimony is 
salient. Greco hopes to account for the testimony cases by saying that an agent being a 
reliable receiver of testimony has default salience in our explanations because of our 
epistemic interests. This is because our practical reasoning context makes it important that 
people have testimony-recipient skills, Greco claims, and so it is salient to us when people 
like Morris receive testimony well.114 But for a number of reasons this contention is 
unsatisfying.  
 
Recall that our aims and interests make salient causal factors we can control and manipulate. 
It makes sense that we would focus on what we can control in a causal nexus, as doing so 
suits our interests and purposes. But why does caring about something in general make it 
salient when it features in a causal nexus?115 It seems that once we introduce the claim that 
people have default salience, the account no longer tracks the natural picture of salience that 
was painted with the first two criteria, and it no longer accords with salience being an 
intuitive everyday notion that picks out what is intuitively ‘important enough’ in a causal 
explanation. That we generally value good recipients of testimony isn’t sufficient to make 
                                                
113 One problem for the account that I don’t explore is Sosa’s criticism that it can be a salient 
feature of an explanation of a success that the agent is in a position to possess the abilities at 
all. [Sosa 2007 p. 80-82, p.86-87] In cases where she could easily have been drugged, or 
easily have been in an unfriendly environment, then what is salient in an explanation is how it 
is that the agent has the abilities and can perform well, rather than that the agent has the 
abilities. However as she does have the abilities, Sosa argues, then she can get the success 
through ability, and so be a knower. In Sosa’s terms, she can have accuracy through 
adroitness; she can be apt. (“That it is apt by luck makes it no less apt”.) Yet, Sosa continues, 
given that the agent’s abilities themselves weren’t salient it is unclear why she fulfils Greco’s 
salience conditions. 
114 Greco 2010 (2010: 73, 75). 
115 If a life boat sinks because it has ten people and ten goats on it, I do not think ‘it sank 
through the weight of the people’ because I care about people more than goats. This is true 
about the mechanisms of salience in causal explanation even though my thoughts will always 
be more with the people (in fact, I will be more inclined to say it is because of the goats 
because I don’t care about goats).   
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them salient in causal explanations. More work needs to be done to establish that agents have 
default salience in this way. 
 
I think that the greatest problem for the salience account of the through relation is simply 
this: Greco claims that intuitions about whether S knows that p vary with intuitions about 
whether the agent’s abilities are salient in a causal explanation of why the agent has a true 
belief that p. Call this the covariance claim. The covariance claim is key to the plausibility of 
his view that explanatory salience captures the through relation. But salience does not home 
in on epistemically relevant features, thus whether the agent is a salient casual feature of a 
case and whether the agent knows can radically diverge. As I will show in the following 
sections, the covariance claim is false. 
 
Firstly I look at some cases that put pressure on an account of knowledge that employs a 
more intuitive notion of salience (one where the explanatory salient cause is that which 
‘stands out’, or ‘seems important’).116 I then look at cases that put pressure on Greco’s 
account of salience more specifically. The cases may not be fatal to the account, as the notion 
of salience can be revised. But if it is revised too much, whether from our intuitive 
judgements of what is salient, or from Greco’s account of salience described above, then it is 
unclear if it is still our everyday notion of salience in play and it suggests that we might be 
better off seeking a different account of the through relation.  
 
Take the following two pairs of cases: 
 
Maths puzzles. Average math student Markus works on a math puzzle. It is a really simple 
puzzle: he wants to know 13x13. He types this in his calculator, and sure enough, gains a true 
belief that the answer is 169. This is a clear case of knowledge, but his abilities aren’t very 
salient. If anything the calculator is salient. It is the kind of thing anyone could do, so his 
abilities don’t ‘stand out’ in a causal explanation of why he comes to form a true belief. Even 
if we grant that agents enjoy a default salience it is not clear that he is salient enough to fulfil 
the conditions. But it is clear that he knows.117  
                                                
116 Recall that tracking intuitive importance is what Greco was intending his account of 
salience to be like. salience is when ‘S’s cognitive abilities are important in an explanation of 
why S believes the truth’ (emphasis mine). Greco 2010: 83-84. Find more evidence 
117 As we are here dealing with an intuitive notion of salience, we don’t need to grant that the 
agent has a default salience. But even if we do, recall that an agent’s default salience can be 
overridden by abnormal factors – this is the key to Greco’s solution to the Gettier cases. So if 
we make the calculator unusually powerful, or add that he only came across the calculator by 
luck, then the agent’s default salience would be overridden. 
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If we take away the calculator, or make the puzzle harder, this makes Markus’s abilities more 
salient. But then it is less clear that we intuit he knows. Thus whether Markus’ abilities are 
salient and whether he knows come apart.  
 
Compare Markus to Maud. Recall that Maud is a math professor who tackles a hard math 
puzzle, and she has spent weeks in her office, drinking Red Bull and scribbling away. 
Eventually she thinks she has solved it. She writes the answer, and believes it. In this case 
Maud’s abilities are clearly salient in how she formed a true belief. No one else could have 
done the puzzle; she has highly honed math skills, a lot of training and excellent 
concentration. But it is less clear that Maud has knowledge. She needs first to publish it in 
peer-reviewed journals and ask her colleagues to check her working before we unhesitatingly 
attribute knowledge. Once she has done these things we will tend to intuit that she knows, but 
it is precisely these things that move salience away from her, and towards the math 
community and her epistemic environment. 
 
This pair of cases puts pressure on his covariance claim, and with it the idea that salience is 
the right way to pick out when the agent knows. Here are a second pair of cases: 
 
Physics Fact. Sally attends the International Physics Convention. All the best scientists are 
there. She asks a question at the reception desk and as the receptionist happens to know that 
there is a world expert on that question in the room. She asks the expert her question, and the 
expert tells her the answer.  
 
In this case Sally’s abilities are not at all salient in an explanation of how she formed the true 
belief, especially compared to all the physics experts, technological advances, and the helpful 
assistant who points out the expert. But my intuition that she knows is strong.  
 
Compare this to Simon. Simon sits in his physics class. The teacher is late and he is 
desperately trying to complete his homework. He asks his classmates ‘what is the nearest 
other star to the sun?’ His classmates mock him, telling him all different answers, and 
riddles. Eventually he manages to tentatively figure it out (perhaps a combination of catching 
glimpses of someone’s notes, discerning who is lying, employing a process of elimination 
etc), and forms a true belief. Simon’s abilities are salient in the explanatory story in this case. 
Yet our intuition that he knows is weak. 
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The epistemically friendlier Simon’s class is, the less salient his abilities are in a causal 
explanation of how he comes to have a true belief, and yet the more inclined I am to intuit 
that he knows. Again, the covariance claim is in trouble. 
 
These cases illustrates a rift between whether S’s cognitive abilities are salient in an 
explanation of why S believes the truth and whether S knows.  Instead what our knowledge 
attributions are tracking is whether the agent possesses the right abilities to ensure the truth 
for beliefs of this type and whether the environment is friendly for forming these beliefs. 
 
If lots of other scientists are standing around the expert physicist when she tells Sally the 
answer, then I am even more inclined to attribute knowledge – because if the physicist told a 
falsehood or made an error one of her colleagues would correct her. But this, if anything, 
makes Sally’s abilities even less salient. She doesn’t even need to monitor for obvious 
falsehood because the other scientists would do it for her.  
 
So much for salience as what tends to stand out or seem important; what about the features of 
the ‘mechanisms of salience’ that Greco draws our attention to? Greco contends that what is 
salient in a causal explanation are those causal conditions that are abnormal and those that 
can be manipulated. They are sensitive to the attributor’s context. 
 
What is unusual: A team of secret agents is trying to crack a code. They have been working 
on the decryption for months. Finally they decide to ask the big shot. They fork over 
thousands of pounds and the great genius comes to the office for the day. His genius is 
mighty, and by the end of the day the code is cracked. One of the technicians, Bill, looks at 
the decryption and thereby forms a true belief about the content. ‘The Swiss are assembling 
an army in Davos.’ Bill did nothing unusual and so isn’t salient in an explanation of Bill’s 
true belief that the Swiss are assembling an army in Davos. In fact, the unusualness of the 
mighty mathematician’s abilities and presence trumps the default salience of the agent (recall 
that the default salience of an agent can be trumped by highly unusual occurrences, as this is 
Greco’s solution to the Gettier case. If salience is determined in part by what is unusual, then 
Bill isn’t salient. And so according to Greco’s account he doesn’t have a true belief through 
his own abilities. 
 
Later that day a spy breaks in. Breaking into the office required great skill, especially in 
cracking security systems (using epistemic abilities). He too looks over the sought-after 
decryption. He is unusual in a causal explanation of his true belief (he has both an unusual 
level of ability to break in, and it is unusual that he is there), and so he is salient. He forms a 
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true belief that ‘the Swiss are assembling an army in Davos’ through his own abilities. And 
so he fulfils the conditions of knowledge. 
 
So if we are to take Greco’s ‘abnormal features’ aspect of salience here, then the spy knows, 
but Bill doesn’t, even though there appear to be no relevant epistemic difference between 
them.  
 
What can be controlled: Imagine a thief hacks into a computer system to steal data. Techie 
One tries to stop the thief by putting up security walls in the system. But he failed because 
the thief was too clever. Meanwhile Techie Two tries to thwart the thief by removing the data 
from the system. But he doesn’t manage in time either. The thief forms a true belief about the 
information on the system: he discovers that Apple is planning to buy Google. If what is 
salient in a causal explanation is in part determined by what one can control, and this is a 
function of attributer context, then this is some reason to think that Techie One and Techie 
Two will have different explanations of why the thief came to form the true belief. Techie 
One will think that the thief has formed true belief because he was able to crack through the 
security walls, as this is something that he had control over. Techie Two will judge that the 
thief formed a true belief because the data was still on the computer, as this is something that 
he could have controlled. The thief’s abilities are the salient factor for Techie Two. This is 
isomorphic to the road traffic accident example that Greco described. Given Greco’s account 
of knowledge, Techie One should rule that the thief knows – the thief’s belief is true through 
the thief’s abilities. Techie Two has a different result: the thief has a true belief because the 
data was still on the computer, and so from this perspective the thief doesn’t meet the 
conditions of knowledge. But there appears to be no epistemically relevant difference 
between them.  
 
These cases are not intended as knockdown arguments against Greco’s account.  Perhaps 
each case can be dealt with by employing the right understanding of salience, since (for 
simplicity of exposition) each example tackled only one aspect of salience at a time. But I am 
sceptical about this because, as we have seen, salience does not isolate epistemically relevant 
features of a case. For any offered account of salience we can make changes in what is salient 
without changes in whether the agent knows, or changes in whether the agent knows without 
a change in salience.  
 
In addition to illustrating that Greco’s view captures the intuitive extension poorly, these 
cases highlight a further problem for Greco’s account. If what can be controlled and what is 
abnormal feature in our mechanisms of salience, then this entails attributer contextualism 
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about knowledge attributions. Knowledge attributions might be true in some contexts of 
utterance, but not in others. This is not new to epistemology. Standards contextualism deems 
that I can tell a person conducting a telephone poll about disability that I know I have hands, 
but I can’t assert it in the sceptical context of the philosophy class. I can say I know I won’t 
be going on holiday next year, but not if you have just mentioned, and so made salient, the 
lottery ticket I just bought. I can say I know my friend Sarah is in Edinburgh right now, but 
not in the high-stakes context of a murder trial. What makes Greco’s attributor contextualism 
new and problematic is that it is neither stakes nor anything plausibly epistemic that makes 
knowledge attributions vary with context of attribution. Instead it is something that is 
epistemically irrelevant: what the speaker can control, or what they deem to be unusual about 
a case. Given these problems for Greco’s view, we should seek a different account of the 
through relation. 
 
It is worth seeing what we have learnt from exploring the salience account. Our explorations 
reinforced the conclusion from exploring the primitivist account, that whether an agent 
knows doesn’t co-vary with the importance of their role in forming a true belief; sometimes 
the agent plays very little role and knows, sometimes the agent plays a large role and doesn’t. 
For this reason attempts to tweak how important the agent’s role must be to handle the barn 
façade county and simple testimony cases will fail. It may be more fruitful to abandon the 
idea that in cases of knowledge the agent must be main cause, salient enough etc, and find 
another way to meet the ability platitude. The agent’s abilities must play some role, and a 
virtue-theoretic account should recognise this. One strength of virtue epistemology is that it 
holds such promise for the ability platitude, explains conversational functions of knowledge 
attributions, and fits with Craig’s proposed teleology for the concept of knowledge. An 
account of knowledge must emphasise the role that the agent plays, and that she must believe 
well, e.g. non-gullibly. However, all this is consistent with the size of the agent’s role not 
being relevant to knowledge. 
 
Additionally, reflecting on these cases reinforces the insight that the agent need not be as 
good where the environment is friendly, but needs more skill if the environment is 
unfriendly. I present my own proposal, that builds on this insight, in chapter five.  
 
But first we should explore a different view, one that (unlike the previous two) doesn’t 





3.3 Manifestation of Disposition 
 
Sosa holds that we should see the through relation of RVE as a manifestation of powers 
rather than as causal salience relation. To illustrate this distinction, imagine a vase is knocked 
off a table and breaks.118 We can say that it broke because it was knocked, and that the table 
was high, the floor was hard, and no one caught it. All of these are picking out causal factors. 
Alternatively we might say that it broke because it was fragile. This second kind of 
explanation, whilst being a causal explanation, doesn’t pick out a salient feature, trigger or 
other pertinent part of a causal chain. In fact, whilst it is causally efficacious, the fragility is 
not best understood as part of a causal chain that broke the vase. Citing fragility as the reason 
why it broke instead picks out a disposition of the vase. We can call this disposition a causal 
power.119 When we say that the vase broke because it was fragile we mean that the vase had a 
certain disposition and it manifested that disposition when it broke: the vase breaking 
manifested its fragility. 
 
Sosa holds that disposition manifestation suggests a promising way to understand the role of 
the agent in knowledge: In cases of knowledge the truth of the belief manifests the agent’s 
disposition to believe truly. Dispositions to believe truly are epistemic competences. 
Epistemic competences are how we make cognitive contact with the world. They are 
dispositions to form beliefs in certain conditions, and a disposition only counts as a 
competence if it is reliably truth conducive in those conditions.120 As dispositions, we possess 
them even when they are not manifesting. Sosa contends this manifestation relation is why 
epistemic normative evaluations home in on the agent’s character: in cases of knowledge the 
success is caused by the agent in the sense of manifesting her competence. 
 
Manifestation RVE: S knows that p iff S’s true belief that p manifests the cognitive 
dispositions constituting the agent’s cognitive character.  
 
In section 2.5 we saw that Sosa characterises knowledge as apt belief, and holds that a belief 
is apt when its correctness is caused by the exercise of a competence.121 Turri claims this is a 
weakness in Sosa’s account: the two characterisations of knowledge that he advocates are not 
coextensive. As Turri sees it, this is because a belief’s being true because it was formed 
competently does not entail that the truth of the belief manifests the competence. There are 
                                                
118 This example is from Pritchard (2010: 44; 2009a :64).  
119 Pritchard (2009a: 65). 
120 Sosa (2007:106). For more on how abilities are environment relative, see section 5.3 
121 Sosa (2007: 108). 
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cases where the belief is true because it was competently formed, even though the truth does 
not thereby manifest the competence.122 To illustrate this distinction, consider the following 
case.123 Watson reasons carefully and competently and forms the belief that the perpetrator of 
a crime walks with a limp. This belief is false, but Holmes, observing how carefully and ably 
Watson formed the belief, and eager for Watson to not feel dejected when he realises that his 
conscientiously formed belief is false, makes the belief Watson formed true by kicking the 
criminal in the leg. The belief is now true because it was formed with competence, but the 
truth doesn’t manifest the competence.  
 
Turri notes that this isn’t a case of knowledge because Watson’s skills don’t stand in the right 
relation to why his belief was true, and that we should be careful to distinguish mere 
causation from the manifestation relation. Only the latter picks out knowledge, and so the 
latter is a more charitable understanding of Sosa’s position.124  
 
Turri gives many examples of when the manifestation relation obtains compared to when it 
doesn’t, claiming that ‘we excel at applying this distinction in a wide range of cases.’ For 
example, ‘Federer regularly smashes wicked forearms because of his skill; he is also lauded 
regularly because of his skill; his skill manifests itself in the former case, but not the 
latter.’125 Turri holds that the manifestation relation is primitive,126 and doesn’t analyse it 
further, claiming that we have a conceptual competence with the idea and can tell when it 
obtains.  
 
Thus both Sosa and Turri claim we have an answer to the Gettier problem: in these cases the 
cognitive success (the fact that belief is true) does not manifest the cognitive competence of 
the agent. In standard cases of knowledge, however, the success does manifest the agent’s 
skill.  
 
This view has much appeal. Firstly it doesn’t inherit the attributer contextualism of Greco’s 
explanatory salience account. Recall that whilst contextualism as such is not a problem for a 
                                                
122 Turri (forthcoming: 11-12). 
123 From Turri (forthcoming). 
124 Note that this case seems peripheral to the analysis of knowledge. Whilst Gettier cases 
seems to be getting at some structural point at the heart of our concept of knowledge, perhaps 
tapping into the anti-luck platitude, this case seems less significant. It is merely exploiting a 
quirk whereby competence can cause truth by a deviant chain, but not revealing anything 
fundamental about knowledge. Therefore the case it less costly to ignore.  
125 Turri (forthcoming: 14). 
126 Turri (forthcoming: 15-16).  
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view,127 Greco’s contextualism is problematic since it entails that many things that are 
epistemically irrelevant about the attributer’s context can bear on whether the agent fulfils the 
of knowledge. Manifestation, in contrast, is independent of any particular standpoint. Thus, 
whilst the view may be altered to deliver standards contextualism (what it takes to virtuously 
believe a proposition, for example, may depend on what is at stake), the through relation 
doesn’t itself entail contextualism. Since contextualism is controversial, this is a merit of the 
view.  
 
Secondly, insofar as manifestation is a robust, familiar and useful aspect of the world, the 
view construes knowledge an instance of a more general kind, and so helps fulfil the criterion 
of making intelligible why we have the concept.128  
 
Thirdly, the view captures the idea that the agent must play a role in getting to the truth, and 
it brings theoretical focus onto the agent without the problematic burden of saying that the 
agent must play a salient or ‘important enough’ role. Thus the view makes good on some of 
the leading motivations for virtue epistemology, such as recognising the importance of agents 
in our socio-cognitive world, satisfying the ability platitude and its associated solution to the 
value problem without the troubling counterexamples of the salience and the primitivist view. 
 
If in cases of knowledge the agent’s cognitive success manifests ability, this can help explain 
the special value of knowledge. Sosa contends that manifestation of ability can confer value 
in part because of what it reveals about the agent, and he suggests that in some domains of 
evaluation what we care about is whether a product was created with competence.129 These 
ideas about the value of knowledge are independent from the achievement thesis. I return to 
this idea in section 5.5.  
 
Finally, this view performs well in the simple testimony case. Although in ordinary cases 
recipients of testimony do not play a central role in an explanation of why their belief is true, 
they do manifest competence (they believe adroitly), and the truth of the belief manifests this 
competence (they believe aptly). Unlike in Greco’s salience account and Zagzebski’s 
                                                
127 Indeed many theorists will consider it a criterion of adequacy that a view can make sense 
of our apparent contextualist intuitions and language use. 
128 Note that when we evaluate these three accounts of the through relation among each other 
according to the criteria of making it intelligible why we have the concept of knowledge and 
why it is the shape that it is, an important aspect of that debate is whether each of these views 
about the through relation are plausible independent from their role in the concept of 
knowledge. If, for example, our primitivist notion turns out to be inconsistent, or the idea of 
manifestation incoherent, then this will be a strike against those views respectively.    
129 Sosa (2007: 74-88, 93-97).  
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primitivism, factors are not ‘vying for position’ in the manifestation relation. The vase 
breaking may manifest both the vase’s fragility and the floor’s hardness, for example, but 
there is no competition or tension between these claims. Similarly Morris’s true belief 
manifests both his and his informant’s abilities. 
  
This account holds a lot of promise. But as it stands it is still somewhat underdeveloped: Sosa 
himself doesn’t discuss in detail what manifestation amounts to, and Turri holds that it is 
primitive. One general challenge facing the account is to explain why some true beliefs 
manifest the competence of the agent, but not others. A proponent of the view might reply, 
for example, that in Gettier cases agents have make errors in their belief-formation (Roddy 
thought the rock), and that is why the belief’s truth does not manifest their competence. But 
knowledge is compatible with reasoning from some error. A scientist may have made a few 
mistakes here and there in her reasoning, for example, but this need not render her final belief 
unknown. A teacher may get one or two facts wrong in her class on the Russian Revolution, 
but the students can still come to know the other facts.  
 
How are we to determine how much error is compatible with a belief’s truth manifesting the 
agent’s competence? If a belief fails to manifest the agent’s abilities whenever the belief is 
only luckily true, or error or double-luck is salient, or the through relation doesn’t intuitively 
hold, then the account is in danger of collapsing into the previous accounts, or importing a 
separate anti-luck condition. Thus the view needs to be developed to explain what 
manifestation consists in. 
 
Another problem for the ‘manifestation of disposition’ understanding of the through relation 
is the barn façade county case. Barney’s abilities to recognise barns are, after all, a factor in 
why the belief he formed was true. They may not have been the largest factor, but that isn’t 
required in order to fulfil the conditions.  
 
In light of the barn façade county case, there are three options available to proponents of the 
disposition manifestation account. Firstly they can hold that agents do know in this case. This 
is the route taken by Sosa and Turri.130 The palatability of this approach depends, among 
other factors, on whether intuitions that Barney lacks knowledge are widespread and resolute. 
A second route is to hold that Barney doesn’t know, but that this is a peripheral case and so 
the mismatch between theory and intuition can be disregarded. But this route seems not to do 
justice to the anti-luck desiderata for theorising about knowledge. After all, Barney could so 
                                                
130 Sosa (2007: 96); Turri (forthcoming: 20).  
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easily have been wrong – had he have been looking at any other barns in the environment, he 
would have formed a false belief. And the case seems to be tapping into a significant aspect 
of our concept of knowledge – the immunity from environmental luck – which suggests that 
it is not a quirky case, but instead is fruitfully seen as a way of tapping into the contours of 
the anti-luck intuition.  
 
 
Chapter Four: Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology 
 
Pritchard suggests that reflecting on cases such as the barn façade county cases motivate the 
thought that mere virtue-theoretic conditions – conditions focusing on the agent’s cognitive 
capacities – can’t eliminate all knowledge-undermining luck. He therefore recommends 
abandoning RVE and instead augmenting virtue-theoretic conditions with a separate anti-
luck condition. The anti-luck condition he advocates is safety: 131 
 
Safety: If S’s true belief that p is safe, then S’s belief that p could not easily have been 
false.132  
 
Pritchard employs a possible worlds framework, and so holds that: 
 
Safety: If S’s true belief is safe, then in most nearby possible worlds where the agent 
believes p, p is true.  
 
Pritchard thus advocates a form of modest virtue epistemology, rejecting the claim that 
knowledge can be understood fully in terms of the notions of true belief, cognitive faculties, 
and the relationship between them. Pritchard notes that once we have a separate anti-luck 
condition in our account of knowledge we can weaken the virtue-theoretic condition. The 
virtue-theoretic condition in virtue epistemology was beefed up to deal with some putative 
counterexamples, such as Gettier cases: The refinement held that the agent must not only 
believe with competence, but the competence must cause or partially explain why the belief 
is true. Pritchard notes that since the anti-luck condition may deal with many such cases, we 
can allow a more permissive account of the role of the agent. Pritchard suggests that for an 
agent to fulfil the virtue condition, the cognitive success need only ‘be to a significant degree 
                                                
131 For accounts of safety, see Sosa (1999; 2000) and Pritchard (2002; 2003; 2005 (esp 
chapter 6); 2007a).  
132 For further refinements of the safety principle, see Pritchard (2009e: 35; m/s: 6-9). 
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creditable to one’s cognitive character’ or ‘partly creditable’ to her, but need not be 
‘primarily creditable’ to her.133  
 
He thus suggests the following account of knowledge, which he calls anti-luck virtue 
epistemology (ALVE):  
 
ALVE: Knowledge is safe belief that arises out of the reliable cognitive traits that 
make up one’s cognitive character, such that one’s cognitive success is to a significant 
degree creditable to one’s cognitive character.134  
 
It should be noted that ‘cognitive success’ refers to true belief, not to safe true belief. The 
condition holds that in cases of knowledge the true belief is (at least in part) creditable to the 
agent, and furthermore the belief is safe. This is not to be confused with the view that the 
agent must also play a role in why the belief is safe. For a defence of latter more stringent 
account of knowledge see Turri (forthcoming).135 136 
 
Pritchard contends we should give the virtue-theoretic condition and the anti-luck condition 
equal theoretic weight, rather than viewing one as a codicil to the other.137 Anti-luck virtue 
epistemology is thus not virtue epistemology with augmented a condition to deal with some 
problem cases. His proposal is instead that knowledge has a bipartite structure.  This is 
because, he claims, the two conditions arise from two distinct ‘master intuitions’ about the 
nature of knowledge: the ability intuition and the anti-luck intuition.138 
 
This account has many virtues. By maintaining that the agent must play some role in the 
cognitive success, anti-luck virtue epistemology promises to vindicate the ability platitude. 
                                                
133 Pritchard (2010:55). He advocates this weakening of the condition in part because he 
thinks that a causal condition will have trouble with the testimony case. As yet it remains 
what Pritchard’s ‘partial credit’ will amount to. Once we see that only the primitivist and the 
salience accounts of the through relation, and not the manifestation account of through, will 
have trouble with the testimony case, then perhaps Pritchard will unpack the role that the 
agent must play to fulfil the conditions of RVE in a way similar to Sosa’s. (See Pritchard 
(2010: 41, 44; 2009b: 413).  
134 Pritchard (2010: 54). 
135 See especially Turri (forthcoming: 22-23).  
136 Pritchard has recently drawn to my attention that he now defends this more stringent 
reading. See Pritchard (m/s: 20). 
137 Some hold that Sosa’s early view was a kind of virtue-theoretic condition, with a safety 
constraint as a codicil (conversation with Greco, March 2009). This is never clear from 
Sosa’s writing, but even if true is a distinct view from Pritchard’s, as Pritchard is offering a 
bipartite structure of knowledge, rather than a virtue theory with a safety condition added.   
138 Pritchard (2010: ch. 3). 
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The safety condition rules out knowledge in a wide array of Gettier cases, including 
challenging cases such as barn façade county. This account can also explain why we cannot 
know whether lottery tickets will win.139 
 
But the position has some difficulties. In section 5.4 I argue that the safety condition as it 
stands read the anti-luck platitude too strongly, and so rules out bone fide cases of 
knowledge. Secondly it is not clear why the view doesn’t rule that Watson knows in the 
Sherlock Holmes case. Recall that in this case Watson believes with ability, and the exercise 
of his cognitive ability partially explains why he forms a true belief about the suspect 
(Holmes was responding to Watson’s efforts and abilities when he made the belief true). 
Furthermore we have no reason to think that his belief is unsafe. Sosa’s view (and arguably 
also the previous two accounts) can explain how Watson did not play the right kind of role 
for the belief to fulfil the conditions of knowledge, but it is hard to see why the case doesn’t 
fulfil Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology conditions.  
 
I think the main problem for anti-luck virtue epistemology is that by invoking an explicit 
modal condition, and thereby advocating a bipartite structure for knowledge, Pritchard 
sacrifices the elegant structure of the robust virtue epistemology schema. On Pritchard’s view 
knowledge is no longer held to be a kind of success from ability, achievement, or even an 
instance of causation or manifestation. This has two ramifications. One is that it makes it less 
intelligible why a concept evolved with this structure. The other is that we lose the potential 
for explaining the value of knowledge that is associated with the RVE schema. 
 
4.1 The Bipartite Structure 
 
Recall that it is a criterion of adequacy that an account of knowledge make intelligible why 
we have the concept that we do. RVE made progress on this criterion by construing 
knowledge as an instance of a more general kind. But the structure of anti-luck virtue 
epistemology is not shared by other common phenomena. 
 
Pritchard claims that he can make more plausible that knowledge has this bipartite structure 
by reflecting on the work of Craig.140 Recall that Craig holds that we can fruitfully illuminate 
                                                
139 Pritchard holds that we cannot know that a given ticket will not win the lottery, no matter 
how unlikely the win nor how well calculated the belief. We also cannot know beliefs 
entailed by the belief it will lose (such as that the possessor will not have enough money for a 
foreign holiday next month). He holds that this is because such beliefs fail to be safe. There 
are nearby worlds the ticket wins the lottery. 
 58 
the nature of knowledge by examining the function it fulfils. Craig contends that our 
contemporary concept of knowledge evolved from the concept proto-knowledge, which was 
used to pick out reliable informants. Examining the nature of reliable informants should, 
Craig holds, shed light on the nature of knowledge.  
 
Pritchard asserts that examining the concept of reliable informant reveals that it is ambiguous 
between someone who possesses a reliable cognitive ability with regard to the subject matter 
and an informant on which we can rely.141 He argues that these two aspects can come apart, 
and that the former corresponds to a virtue-theoretic condition on the concept of reliable 
informant whilst the latter corresponds to a modal condition. On his view if the potential 
informant fails to satisfy either one of these two conjuncts then she doesn’t properly fall 
under the extension of the concept of ‘reliable informant’.  He holds that we should 
accordingly expect knowledge to have these two aspects.  
 
Recall that the keystone in a defence of robust virtue epistemology is arguing that ability 
conditions can rule out all cases of knowledge-undermining luck without recourse to a 
separate anti-luck condition. If Pritchard can establish a case where a potential informant 
possesses the relevant ability and yet is not a reliable informant because he does not satisfy 
the modal condition, then this would be evidence that the concept of reliable informant has a 
modal aspect whose obtaining is not guaranteed by the obtaining of the ability aspect. If the 
concept of knowledge were shaped by the concept of reliable informant and the concept of 
reliable informant has these two distinct aspects, then we should expect the concept of 
knowledge to have two separate conditions. This would be strong evidence that knowledge 
has a bipartite structure rather than the structure proposed by RVE.   
 
The following, adapted from Pritchard, is intended to be a case where the agent possesses the 
relevant abilities yet fails to be a reliable informant because the agent does not satisfy the 
modal condition:142 (I have given the characters names) 
 
Consider an agent, Fred, who possesses a reliable cognitive ability as regards a certain 
subject matter but who is in an environment in which there exists a misleading 
defeater, Ginger has heard about, but which Fred (the prospective informant) does not, 
and one which moreover, Ginger is unable to defeat. An example might be where Fred 
                                                                                                                                      
140 Pritchard’s diagnostic about the bipartite structure of knowledge can be found in Pritchard 
(2010) 59-62 and Pritchard (m/s) 21-24 
141 Pritchard (2010: 60-61). 
142 Pritchard (2010: 61; m/s: 23) 
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is a reliable barn-detector but where Ginger has been given a misleading ground for 
supposing that Fred is in barn façade county (e.g., false testimony from a good source). 
So Fred is in fact a reliable informant about the relevant subject matter. But given that 
Ginger knows about the misleading defeater, and that she is unable to defeat that 
defeater, would she be able to rely on this informant (Fred)? Surely not.   
 
In order to drive a wedge between the modal aspect and the ability aspect of the concepts of 
reliable informant, and thereby of knowledge, Fred must satisfy the latter yet fail to satisfy 
the former condition. Pritchard claims that in this case Ginger should withhold the 
knowledge attribution because of the presence of knowledge-undermining luck, even though 
Fred possesses the relevant ability, and goes on to claim that the case supports the second 
conjunct below: 
 
The concept of knowledge that results will both (i) disallow cases of true belief as 
knowledge where the belief isn’t appropriately due to a substantive degree to the 
relevant cognitive ability, and (ii) disallow cases of true belief as knowledge where the 
truth of the belief is substantively due to luck and hence unsafe [even though the true 
belief is appropriately due to a substantive degree to the relevant cognitive ability]. 143 
 
It is far from clear, however, that Ginger should withhold the attribution because of a modal 
condition on knowledge or good informant. After all, Ginger believes that Fred is in Barn 
Façade County, and so believes that he is unable to distinguish real barns from mere facades. 
If you were to ask Ginger in virtue of what she withholds a knowledge attribution, she is 
likely to say ‘Fred can’t discriminate barns from fake barns’. This is a reason that homes in 
on his cognitive character, and so seems more in line with virtue epistemology.  It is less 
likely that she would say something like ‘he could easily be wrong’, which would be a modal 
condition. Pritchard thus hasn’t established that her withholding of the knowledge attributing 
is evidence for a separate modal condition.  
 
In this case, furthermore, the ability condition and the modal condition do not come apart. 
This is because from Ginger’s perspective Fred’s true beliefs don’t fulfil the modal condition 
(he could easily have been wrong), but from her perspective he doesn’t fulfil the ability 
condition either: she believes that he can’t reliably detect barns in his environment. 
Meanwhile, from the external perspective we know that Ginger is mistaken and Fred is not in 
barn facade county. We know that his beliefs enjoy modal stability, but we also know that he 
                                                
143 Pritchard (2010: 62) 
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has the right abilities for the environment. Thus the case fails to separate the two aspects of 
good informant in the way Pritchard must if he is to establish the bipartite structure of 
knowledge. The relative elegance of robust virtue epistemology places the burden of 
argument on the proponent of anti-luck virtue epistemology.  
 
4.2 ALVE and Value 
 
The second weakness of anti-luck virtue epistemology is that it abandons the view that 
knowledge has the distinctive value of success through ability or achievements. Pritchard 
concedes that as robust virtue epistemology (and its associated explanation of the value of 
knowledge) was the most promising explanation of the final value of knowledge, we should 
abandon the idea that knowledge has a distinctive final value and provide an error theory for 
our intuition that knowledge is finally valuable.144 He does so by suggesting that some 
classes of knowledge and understanding-why (which is a close cousin of knowledge) do have 
distinctive value, and it is this that we are thinking about when we value knowledge.145 Thus 
we are mistaken to hold knowledge as distinctively valuable, but related epistemic standings 
do enjoy such value.  
 
This is a somewhat radical suggestion since both epistemologists and lay people tend to treat 
knowledge as valuable. If knowledge does not have distinctive value it makes it puzzling as 
to why it is the focus of so much of our attention. Pritchard’s diagnosis for why we think that 
knowledge is distinctively valuable is also suspect. He holds that when we think of 
knowledge we tend to think of cases which are also achievements, and hence enjoy this 
distinctive final value possessed by achievements.146 When we think of knowledge, that is, 
we think not of simple testimonial cases, but of cases where the agent overcomes a 
significant obstacle or exercises great skill. But what Pritchard suggests are paradigmatic 
cases of knowledge are far more rare than those cases of knowledge which are not an 
achievement by Pritchard’s lights. He holds that knowledge is not an achievement, and 
therefore is not finally valuable, in usual cases of perception and testimony. By comparison 
knowledge which is also an achievement is rare. It is thus curious that when we think of 
paradigmatic cases of knowledge it should be the rarer kind that spring to mind. It seems 
more likely that our paradigmatic cases of knowledge coincide with everyday knowledge, the 
kind that helps us navigate our daily lives. This is a weakness in his error theory. 
 
                                                
144 Pritchard (2010: Esp. 62-65. 86-88).  
145 Pritchard (2010: 66). 
146 Pritchard (2010: 63, 73). 
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Furthermore, an even greater problem afflicts anti-luck virtue epistemology. Recall that it is a 
problem for a theory if it renders knowledge into constituents, which do not each contribute 
value to the whole. Such an account leaves puzzling why we focus on knowledge, rather than 
the axiologically identical subset of its constituents.  
 
Pritchard holds that knowledge is true belief which is to a significant degree creditable to 
one’s cognitive character and which is also safe. As we have seen, the virtue-theoretic aspect 
of this account explains why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. But the 
safety condition on knowledge does not. Safe true belief, I argue in another work,147 is no 
more valuable than mere true belief, and so by Pritchard’s account knowledge is not more 
valuable than a proper subset of its parts.148  
 
Given the difficulty of establishing that safety adds value to a true belief, this licenses us to 
think that anti-luck virtue epistemology cannot vindicate either of the stronger value claims 
on knowledge. An alternative route available to Pritchard is to agree that safety does not add 
value to true belief, and so to bite the bullet that knowledge is not more valuable than a 
proper subset of its parts, but maintain that safety is nevertheless needed in an account of 
knowledge. He could hold that it is required to capture the intuitive extension and to do 
justice to the anti-luck platitude. But I hope to show that virtue-theoretic conditions by 
themselves can do these things, and that therefore the safety condition is redundant. In 
particular I show how my proposed robust virtue epistemology can account for the various 
ways that knowledge is immune from knowledge-undermining luck without introducing an 
explicit modal condition.  
 
 
Chapter Five: A New Proposal for Robust Virtue Epistemology 
 
Having explored three robust virtue epistemology accounts of knowledge and a modest virtue 
epistemology, I shall now introduce my own account, which seeks to address the weaknesses 
in the other accounts. One insight that we have made from examining knowledge from 
testimony, books, and apparatus is that more than one thing can play a role in gaining 
                                                
147 For arguments for this claim see Gardiner (unpublished: esp. 6-12).  
148 Pritchard, of course, could maintain that safety does add value to a true belief, and so hold 
that this curious axiology does not occur. If safety does add value to the whole, then anti-luck 
virtue epistemology entails that knowledge is more valuable than a proper subset of its parts, 
and so vindicates the value platitude. Alas I do not have the space here to explore the ways 
that we might try to establish the value that safety adds to true belief, and it would take us too 
far a field to do so. See Gardiner (unpublished). 
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knowledge. From looking at the salience and primitivist accounts of RVE’s through relation 
we have learnt that the importance or salience of the agent’s role is not a good strategy for 
accounting for the nature of knowledge, because what is important about a case and what is 
epistemically relevant about a case can come apart. This suggests we need a theory of 
knowledge that respects the plurality of factors contributing to true belief-formation without 
cherry-picking some features as uniquely important.  
 
5.1 Mackie’s INUS account of causation 
 
We find resources for completing this task in the work of J.L. Mackie’s account of our 
concept of causation, the relevant features of which descend from J.S. Mill.149 Mill was 
hoping to improve on a Humean regularity theory of causation. Mill first notes that regular 
sequences of events (constant conjunctions) are not between an outcome and a single cause, 
but rather between the outcome and ‘the sum of several antecedents; the concurrence of all of 
them being requisite to produce… the consequent’.150 In other words, the regularities are 
between the outcome and a cluster of causing conditions, all of which were necessary in the 
circumstances to bring about the effect.151  As a corollary to this observation, Mill claims that 
although we tend to call the most recent factor – ‘the one condition which came last into 
existence’ – the cause, strictly we ought not to.152 This is because as each of the conditions 
was ‘equally indispensable to the production of the consequent’ we shouldn’t give the name 
of cause to one causal condition to the exclusivity of the others.153  
 
Secondly Mill notes that: 
 
It is not true that one effect must be connected with only one cause, or assemblage of 
conditions; that each phenomenon can be produced only one way. There are often 
several independent modes in which the same phenomenon could have originated. One 
fact … may follow any one of several antecedents, or collections of antecedents. A 
                                                
149 Mill, J.S. (1911: ch. 5 section 3). See also Psillos (2002: 59-62). 
150 Mill, J. S. (1911: 214) 
151 ‘Necessary in the circumstances’ means that if the condition were to have not obtained in 
those circumstances, the effect would not have occurred. However the condition may not be 
strictly necessary for the effect, as a different set of conditions could have caused the same 
outcomes. We will be returning to these ideas throughout this section. See Mackie (1974: 31, 
64-65). 
152 Mackie (1974: 215).  
153 Mill (1911: 214). 
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given effect may really be produced by a certain cause, and yet be perfectly capable of 
being reproduced without it.154  
 
In other words, a given outcome may have a plurality of different causes; different sets of 
antecedent conditions could have brought about the same result.  
 
Mackie develops these two ideas further and it is Mackie’s systemisation and refinement of 
Mill’s insights that I shall focus on.155 I do not intend to give a thorough account of his full 
view of causation, however, but rather only the parts relevant for my proposed account of 
through relation in robust virtue epistemology.  
 
There are three initially relevant features of Mackie’s account. Firstly, Mackie is aiming to 
give an account of our concept of causation, as distinct from causation ‘as it is in the 
objects’156. Secondly he doesn’t purport to capture all of causal language. His project is less 
ambitious; he intends to capture the meaning of a great many uses, and describe what it is 
‘typically called a cause’.157 Thirdly Mackie, like Mill, is ecumenical about the ontology of 
causal relata. For Mackie causes (and effects) can be events, states or properties.158 This 
flexibility fits well with epistemology because we often talk as though events, properties of 
the agents, or states of the world can variously be the reason why someone came to know 
something. ‘He found out because she told him’ cites an event, for example, whilst ‘he’ll get 
to the bottom of this because he is so thorough’ cites a trait or property of a person, as does 
‘she’ll see it, she has eyes like a hawk’. ‘She got the right answer because she put in the time’ 
cites a fact. I will refer to ‘causal conditions’ or simple ‘causes’ when I describe causal relata 
in order to preserve this pluralism about what can be a cause.159  
 
                                                
154 Mill (1911: ch. 10 section 1).  
155 Note though that, unlike Mill, Mackie was not an advocate of Humean regularity views of 
causation. In particular he thought that it failed to capture a key aspect of our concept of 
causation, namely the counterfactual relationships that hold between effects and their causes. 
Mackie holds that ‘A caused B’ often means something like ‘if A hadn’t happened (in the 
circumstances) then B wouldn’t have happened’, and that regularity views of causation 
cannot do justice to this aspect of the concept. See. Mackie (1974: Ch. 2 and page 60, 77). 
156 This distinction is between the questions ‘what do causal statements mean’ and ‘what 
constitutes causation as it is in the objects’, see Mackie (1974: 77). 
157 Mackie (1974: 64; 1965: 37). 
158 Mackie (1974: 62 and chapter 10). 
159 Some people hold that only events, properties or facts can be causal relata. I hope to avoid 
this debate, but I expect that Mackie’s account of causation can be refined to be amendable to 
such (more restrictive) views.  
 64 
To illustrate Mackie’s account, take a set of conditions that caused a particular window to 
break. Such a list might include: Sally threw the ball with a window breaking speed and 
direction; Billy was too distracted to catch the ball; Billy was the only person between Sally 
and the window. The list may also include absences, such as the absence of any object that 
would block ball’s trajectory. There are many things to note about this list of conditions. 
Firstly, the conjunction of the conditions was sufficient for the effect. This means that 
whenever that set of conditions occurs, the effect occurs. And each of the conditions in the 
set are non-redundant in the causal nexus for bringing about the effect. This means that they 
were necessary in the circumstances for the effect: if the condition didn’t obtain then the 
effect wouldn’t occur. (If the condition is irrelevant to the effect, such as that Maradona had 
signed the ball, then it wouldn’t have been in the list of causes). Mackie calls such a set a 
‘minimally sufficient condition’, or ‘MSC’: ‘minimal’ because there are no redundant parts, 
‘sufficient’ because it is sufficient for bringing about the effect. The minimally sufficient 
condition amounts to the ‘assemblage of antecedent conditions’ that Mill refers to in his 
observation that causal relata are usually between an effect and a cluster of causes.  
 
But note that a different set of conditions could have brought about the same effect. 
Something else could have caused the window to break. Perhaps Billy threw the ball, and 
Sally failed to catch it, or Sally threw a rock instead of a ball. There may be many different 
sets of minimally sufficient conditions that could have brought about the effect. This 
corresponds to Mill’s second observation: that different antecedent conditions can bring 
about the same outcome. Mackie calls the ‘full cause’ the disjunction of all of these MSCs.160 
161 
 
Mackie holds that when we cite a cause we often mean to refer to one of the individual 
conditions (one of the conjuncts in the minimally sufficient condition). For example, the 
window broke because Sally threw the ball, or the window broke because Billy was too 
distracted to catch the ball. He calls these individual conjuncts ‘inus conditions’. They are so 
called because they are ‘an insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but 
sufficient condition’ to bring about the effect (emphasis in original).162 The inus conditions 
                                                
160 Note that Mackie’s ‘full cause’ is different from Mill’s ‘total cause’. Mill’s total cause 
refers to one MSC (the one which obtained) [Mill (1911: 214). In contrast Mackie’s ‘full 
cause’ refers to the disjunction of all the conjunctions. Mackie (1974: 64). 
161 The obtaining of this disjunction of MSCs is both sufficient and necessary for the effect. 
Mackie holds that were someone to defend RVC, it would be constant conjunctions between 
effects and these complex disjunctions (the ‘total cause’) that would be the most plausible 
account. See for example Mackie (1974: 64). 
162 The term INUS is introduced in Mackie (1965). See Also Mackie (1974 p.62).  
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are insufficient because they alone will not bring about the effect; they need the other 
members of the MSC to be present. Billy not catching the ball isn’t sufficient for causing the 
window to break, Sally had to throw it; similarly, Sally’s throwing it isn’t enough to bring 
about the effect, the absence of objects that would block the trajectory is also needed. Inus 
conditions are non-redundant because they are necessary-in-the-circumstances. The other 
conditions in the MSC do not bring about the effect if an inus condition is absent (if one of 
conditions in the list didn’t not obtain, the window would not have broken). The minimally 
sufficient condition is unnecessary because a different set of conditions could have brought 
about the effect (such where Billy throws the ball and Sally doesn’t catch it), but it is 
sufficient, because whenever the minimally sufficient conditon obtains, the effect occurs.  
 
Mackie continues that something is a cause if it is ‘at least an inus condition’ for the effect. A 
condition might be ‘more than an inus condition’ if, for example, it is a sufficient and 
necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition. In such cases the single condition 
alone is sufficient to guarantee the effect. Or it might be an insufficient but non-redundant 
part of a necessary and sufficient condition. That is, it is a condition in the only set of 
conditions that can bring the effect about. In this case the cause is necessary for the effect. A 
condition can be even stronger: it can be the only condition in the only set of conditions that 
can bring about the effect. Such a condition is necessary and sufficient for the effect. 
 
Mackie develops this account because he recognised that claims about necessity and 
sufficiency were important in our concept of causation, but he recognised also that naïve 
accounts (such as ‘A caused P’ means ‘A is necessary for P’ or  ‘A caused P’ means ‘A is 
sufficient for P’) have many counterexamples. In contrast, the inus account captures many of 
our intuitive notions of cause.163  
 
Mackie notes that ‘if two factors are necessary in the circumstances, then they are equally 
necessary; one inus condition cannot be more of an inus condition than the other.’164 Thus we 
should consider them all equally as causes. Each causal factor ‘is clearly related to [the 
effect] in an important way’: they are necessary in the circumstances.165 Like Mill, Mackie 
                                                
163 As Mackie says, ‘the proof of this suggestion would be that in many cases the falsifying of 
any of [the claims in his account of knowledge] would rebut the assertion that A caused P’. 
Mackie (1965: p.37). 
164 Mackie (1974: 128). 
165 Mackie (1974: 62). 
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notes that we have a tendency to pick out one inus condition and label it ‘the cause’, and 
asserts that this is a function of pragmatics and not the concept of causation.166  
 
Mackie also notes that some inus conditions will be less replaceable than others. He cites the 
example of a fire (negligently begun) that was about to flicker out, until an arsonist poured 
paraffin on the embers. The fire thus rejuvenated then destroys a nearby house.167 Mackie 
holds that as it was the same fire, the original starting of the fire was a non-redundant factor 
that lead to the effect in the actual course of events, but he oberves that this factor ‘could 
have easily been replaced’: if the arsonist had not found the embers, he would have instead 
struck a match to burn the house. Mackie argues that ‘very natural and widespread human 
purposes will lead us to pin the cost upon an act which, if it had not occurred, would not have 
been likely to be replaced in the causal network rather than upon one for which a substitute 
would have almost certainly been found’.168 This means that although two inus conditions 
might be equally necessary in the circumstances, and so both be causes, it usually serves our 
interests to focus our praise and blame behaviour on the factor whose absence would have 
been less likely to be replaced.169  
 
Mackie provides further conditions for something to be a cause: the inus condition condition, 
along with all the other conditions in the MSC, must be present on the occasion.  He also 
contends that for something to qualify as a cause the other MSCs must not be present on the 
occasion.170 A further refinement of his view is a distinction between the causes and the 
causal field, the latter being the backdrop on which the causing takes place.171 These details 
of Mackie’s account need not concern us here, however, as for our purposes in epistemology 
the details I have provided ought suffice. Note too that if Mackie’s account of causation fails, 
then another similar view might serve as well. For this reason I will not defend Mackie’s inus 




                                                
166 Mackie (1974: 34- 36).  
167 Mackie (1974: ch. 5). 
168 Mackie (1974: 128). 
169 Mackie (1974: 127-128). 
170 This is a condition in his 1965 account Mackie (1965: 37). However in Mackie (1974: 
128) he says that when two minimal sufficient conditions both occur the conjuncts in both of 
them will still count as causes. These two claims are in conflict. I do not know which his 
considered view is, but such details do not matter for our purposes.  
171 Mackie (1974: 63). See also Mackie (1975: 39ff) and Psillos (2002: 61).    
172 For critical responses to Mackie see Scriven (1966); Kim (1791; 1973). 
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5.2 INUS and RVE  
 
We can now apply Mackie’s theory of causation to robust virtue epistemology’s through 
relation. Recall that RVE holds that:  
 
RVE: S knows that p iff S’s cognitive success is through the exercise of her own 
cognitive abilities. 
 
Orthodox understandings of RVE had problems with cases such as testimony and knowledge 
from books and apparatus. This is because in such cases the agent is not playing the largest or 
most important role, and so it seems that the truth is reached through something else, rather 
than the agent’s epistemic abilities. I argued that as such cases unequivocally involve 
knowledge we must look for an account of the through relation. We need an account of 
knowledge that vindicates how a belief can be true through the abilities of the informant and 
through the abilities of the agent, without these causal factors being in competition with each 
other. In Mackie’s inus analysis we have found a promising suggestion: an account of 
causation that reflects the plurality of factors that bring about an outcome whilst respecting 
the importance (understood as necessity in the circumstances) of those factors.    
 
I thus suggest the through relation should be understood with Mackie’s inus conditions 
account of our concept of cause: in all and only cases of knowledge the agent’s cognitive 
abilities were (at least) an inus condition for the cognitive success.  
 
Recall also that when we are analysing knowledge the relevant cognitive success is that the 
belief is true, rather than that the belief is held. This means that the relevant inus conditions 
are the conditions that cause the fact that the belief is true rather than false. Thus the account 
can be formulated:  
 
New Proposal RVE: S knows that p iff S’s epistemic abilities are at least an inus 
condition for why S’s belief that p is true. 
 
This account explains why in many cases of true belief, such as Morris’s finding out the 
location of Sears Tower, many factors can be easily switched for something else. Morris 
could have asked a different informant, for example, or consulted a map. They are easily 
replaceable inus conditions. But in cases of knowledge Morris’s abilities will be an inus 
condition in every minimally sufficient condition for bringing about the effect of his having a 
true belief. If Morris’s abilities aren’t playing a role in why his belief is true then it isn’t a 
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case of knowledge. Thus the proposed view does justice to the ability platitude: in cases of 
knowledge the agent’s abilities must be involved in bringing about the cognitive success. 
Which of the agent’s abilities are in play might differ in different MSCs. Perhaps he used his 
eyesight to discover the location of the Sears Tower in one MSC, his map reading skills in 
another, his testimony-receiving skills in another. The key thing is that at least one of his 
abilities is an inus condition. 
 
In fact, I think that this account performs better at capturing the demands of the ability 
platitude than Greco’s salience account. It is unintuitive to think that the ability platitude is so 
that in cases of knowledge the agent is salient in why her belief is true; it accords better with 
the ability platitude to say that they must play some role.173  
 
The agent therefore is not ‘replaceable’ in Mackie’s sense, and this may be why we tend to 
praise or blame the agent for her knowledge. This puts the agent at the centre of 
epistemological evaluation. (In some recondite cases of knowledge, the ideas are so esoteric 
that the informants are not easily replaceable, but in these cases we tend to praise the 
informants to a higher degree than when the ideas are more accessible. Perhaps this too is 
best understood using Mackie’s insight that our general practical interests are best satisfied 
when our praise and blame behaviour focuses on those inus conditions that cannot be easily 
replaced.)  
 
Thus the proposed account of knowledge shows how agents such as Morris can know in 
cases of testimony and in all the other such cases where the agent’s belief is aided by other 
factors. That there were other inus conditions in the causal nexus doesn’t remove the status of 
‘cause’ from the agent’s abilities. So Morris was a cause. The belief was true through 
Morris’s abilities, and so Morris fulfils the conditions of robust virtue epistemology. 
 
This account also explains why an agent doesn’t know in Gettier cases. To illustrate how, 
first consider a standard case of perceptual knowledge: a woman looks through her window 
and spots her husband sitting in his armchair. She forms the corresponding belief that her 
husband is in their living room. In this case her abilities at recognising her husband are an 
inus condition for why her belief is true. When we explain why her belief is true, her abilities 
play a non-redundant role. A counterfactual relationship also obtains between her believing 
                                                
173 Or to put the point a little differently, we do not intuitively judge that Rene the Gambler or 
Roddy the Shepherd don’t know based on the fact that they are not salient in a causal 
explanation of their successes. Rather the reason behind our intuitive judgement is that their 
abilities aren’t involved at all. 
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with ability and her belief’s being true. If we go to the nearest possible worlds where she has 
that belief, but didn’t believe with ability, and we hold other features the same, then in most 
of those worlds she doesn’t believe truly. Her ability was necessary in the circumstances for 
the truth of her belief and thus it was a success through ability according to this account.  
 
We can contrast this case with Zagzebski’s husband Gettier case: A woman looks through the 
window and spots a person who looks like her husband in his armchair. She correspondingly 
forms the belief ‘my husband is in our living room’. In this case, however, the person she is 
looking at is her husband’s brother. Unbeknown to the wife her husband is in another chair in 
the living room out of sight. The belief is thus true. In this case although the wife’s belief is 
held with ability, it is not true because of ability. Her abilities are not an inus condition for 
why her belief is true. They are redundant in the set of conditions prior to her true belief. To 
see this consider that if she had believed without ability, she saw a cat, say, and on this basis 
believed that her husband was in the room then in the same number of nearby worlds her 
belief would have been true. There is no counterfactual relationship between her belief being 
held with ability and her belief being true.  
 
Similarly where a shepherd is looking at a sheep in a field and comes to form a true belief, 
the shepherd’s abilities are an inus condition in why his belief is true. We can see this 
because the relevant counterfactual conditions obtain. If we remove that inus condition – if 
the shepherd didn’t believe with ability and instead guessed or looked at a tractor whilst 
mistaking it for a sheep – then in nearby worlds the shepherd does not form a true belief. This 
illustrates that there is a counterfactual dependence between his believing with ability and his 
gaining the success, so he is an inus condition for the truth of his belief.  
 
Here again we can contrast this with a Gettier case: Roddy looks at a sheep-shaped object 
and so forms the belief that there is a sheep in that field. Roddy’s abilities cause him to have 
this belief, but his abilities do not cause his belief to be true. They are not an inus condition 
for his knowledge-relevant success. We can see this because if we go to the nearest worlds 
where his abilities are not engaged, perhaps the rock is bright blue and not sheep-shaped, 
then the belief that he forms is true in many of these worlds. He believes irrationally, but 
there is still a sheep there. Again this illustrates that there is no counterfactual dependence in 
Gettier cases between the belief being formed with ability and the belief being true. Roddy’s 
abilities are redundant in a causal explanation of why his belief is true – if he had believed 
without ability he would still have formed a true belief.  
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On most understandings cases where the agent doesn’t believe with ability do not count as 
Gettier cases. This is because the beliefs are not justified. This does not affect the point I am 
illustrating, however, which is that once we have distinguished between the outcomes of a 
belief’s being held and a belief’s being true, we can see that only the latter is a success 
relevant to knowledge. And so we can see that in standard Gettier cases the agent’s abilities 
are not an inus condition for the knowledge-relevant cognitive success.  
 
By employing Mackie’s framework and looking at whether the truth of the belief is sensitive 
to whether the agent believes with ability, this account does justice to the anti-luck platitude. 
But it does so without employing an additional modal condition.  We can see how the agent 
must have a kind of sensitivity to the facts, but this is accounted for by the inus conditions. 
Thus the robust virtue epistemology proposed here rules out intervening luck without 
recourse to a separate anti-luck condition. 
 
As well as handling cases of knowledge from testimony, books, and instruments and 
explaining why the agent doesn’t fulfil the conditions of knowledge in Gettier cases, this 
account has other virtues.  It puts the focus of epistemological theorising in the right places: it 
highlights the importance of the role of the agent and which abilities she used. It also 
emphasises the role of the environment and other factors that aid the agent.174 Applying 
Mackie’s analysis of causation to robust virtue epistemology shows us why the agent is so 
essential in our epistemological theorising – her abilities are necessary in every MSC where 
her true beliefs are knowledge. And if an inus analysis best captures many of our uses of 
causal language, as Mackie holds, then this proposal of applying Mackie’s inus account to 
robust virtue epistemology has the virtue of making knowledge cohere well with other 
familiar concepts.  
 
Thus rather than being a problem for robust virtue epistemology, the simple testimony case 
should be seen as indicating that we need an account of the through relation that respects that 
a plurality of conditions can be working together to cause a true belief. We should take it as a 
guiding case for finding the correct through relation for virtue epistemology.  
 
                                                
174 Zagzebski holds that a theory of knowledge should not only tell us what knowledge is, but 
also how to get more of it. It should have a practical guiding role. [Zagzebski (1996: 267; 
1999)] I do not weigh-in on whether this is a good criterion for knowledge, but we should 
note that the proposed account performs well at satisfying this criterion it by homing in on 
what to improve in order to gain knowledge: the agent’s abilities and other factors that can 
play a role in an MSC.  
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But what about the barn façade county case? In this case the fact that the belief is true is not 
divorced from the abilities of the agent. Some luck is involved (he was lucky that he was 
looking at the one real barn when he formed his belief), but the agent’s abilities also play a 
non-redundant role in why the belief is true. He recognises a barn and so forms the 
appropriate belief. As the abilities are playing some role, they are an inus condition for the 
fact that the belief is true. When we look at the counterfactuals we see a dependency 
relationship between the fact that the belief was formed with some ability and the fact that 
the belief is true. In most nearby worlds where he didn’t form the belief with ability, he forms 
a false belief. 
 
Even when we distinguish between causes for why he has that belief with causes for why his 
belief his true, Barney is still an inus condition. His eyesight and barn-recognition played a 
non-redundant role in why his belief is true. Should we conclude that this inus-account of 
RVE cannot deal with such cases? One option is to bite this bullet and allow that Barney 
knows there is a barn. But I think that there is more to say about the barn façade county case.  
 
5.3 Abilities and Barn Facades 
 
I hope I have given reason to think that altering the same aspect of the through relation to try 
and capture a ‘sweet spot’ that deals with both horns of the Lackey/Pritchard dilemma is not 
a promising strategy. I doubt, for example, that it will work to try to figure out how salient an 
agent must be to qualify for knowledge in the testimony case yet not fulfil the conditions in 
the Barn Façade County case. A new approach, such as refining two different aspects of the 
account, holds more promise. The testimony case revealed that proponents of robust virtue 
epistemology were using the wrong notion of the through relation and we have amended the 
view accordingly. But what does the barn façade county case teach us?  
 
As we have already seen in section 3.3, abilities are relative to environments. Sosa explains 
that ‘a disposition can be a competence only if it’s sufficiently reliable, at least in its 
distinctively appropriate conditions,’175 Developing this point, Greco notes that:176 
 
                                                
175 Sosa (2007:106). See also Sosa (2007: 82-84). ‘  
176 Greco (m/s: 29). Greco also explains that ‘different abilities require different degrees of 
reliability.  Thus Kobe Bryant is a great free-throw shooter because he is successful around 
85% of the time.  Jeter is a great hitter because he is successful around 30% of the time.’ 
There is a further potential development of this view, which holds that different practical 
stakes may require different degrees of reliability in order to qualify as ‘abled’. This would 
allow us to accommodate contextualist intuitions. I do not explore this possibility here, but it 
is an avenue for further inquiry.   
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An ability in general is a disposition to achieve some relevant success, in relevant 
circumstances, relative to some environment, with a sufficient degree of reliability. We 
need to say “in relevant circumstances,” because failing in some circumstances does 
not count against ability.  For example, it does not count against Derek Jeter’s ability 
to hit baseballs that he would fail in poor lighting conditions. We need to say “relative 
to an environment”, because an agent might have an ability relative to one 
environment but not another.  For example, Jeter has the ability to hit baseballs in 
typical baseball environments, but presumably not in an active war zone, where he 
would be too distracted.  
 
These theorists recognise that when we talk about an ability that an agent possesses, we have 
in mind that the agent can manifest the ability with reliable success in certain characteristic 
environments. The fact that the agent cannot succeed at the task in abnormal conditions need 
not mean that they do not possess the ability.  
 
To see how this applies to the barn façade county case, recall that when we looked at the case 
of Fred and Ginger we judged that Ginger would not consider Fred a good informant 
because, whilst he can normally identify barns, he doesn’t have the ability to identify barns in 
the environment that she believed he was in. (See section 4.1.) The ability relevant to barn 
beliefs and barn knowledge is the ability to identify barns. This requires distinguishing barns 
from other things that might be in the environment. If an agent cannot distinguish barns from 
other things, perhaps because they have bad eyesight or it is dark, we would not attribute 
knowledge to them, even where they form a true belief. This is, I submit, precisely because 
they do not have the ability to distinguish barns from other things in their environment.177 
What is crucial for possessing the relevant ability is not that you can discriminate barns from 
any other thing, but only that you can discriminate them from other things in the relevant 
environment.178  
                                                
177 Pritchard might hold that the reason that such people don’t know is because they could 
easily have been wrong. Firstly I think that this is less natural to our everyday thought to 
focus on the modal conditions of beliefs. We more naturally think about people and abilities, 
which although modal are not explicitly modal, and are more familiar concepts. Secondly, I 
submit that ‘they could easily be wrong’ may amount in our folk thinking to ‘the agent 
doesn’t have the skills to ensure he gets to the truth’. This is because ‘could easily be wrong’ 
entails that the agent wouldn’t detect if they weren’t looking at a barn in that environment, 
which is an ability-level thing. Often ‘we could be…’ amounts to ‘we don’t have the ability 
to know otherwise’, e.g. ‘we could be dead next week’, or ‘we could be brains in vats’.    
178 Thus, to explain the robots example in (Pritchard 2008b: 23,35), knowing that the objects 
in front of you are your children doesn’t require that you are able to distinguish your children 
from extremely life-like robots unless there are robot makers acting in environment (so that 
they might deceive you).  
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One this version of my proposal in the barn façade county case the agent doesn’t know 
because in the environment that he is in he does not have the ability to distinguish barns from 
other things. He doesn’t know that he is in this environment, so he will continue to form 
barn-beliefs, but he will do so unreliably. An environment can rob you of your reliability, and 
therefore your ability to believe well and to know, without your being aware that you are in 
the environment.  
 
That an environment can block knowledge should be no surprise. Recall that the worse an 
environment is, the more an agent must do, and the more skilled an agents needs to be, in 
order to know. Correspondingly, the more epistemically friendly an environment is the easier 
it is for the agent to gain knowledge. This is illustrated by, among others, the physics fact 
case. At the physics convention the environment was excellent for Sally’s belief-forming: she 
was surrounded by experts. She didn’t need a high level of ability in order to know. In fact 
the environment was so friendly that she barely needed to even filter for truth.179 Meanwhile 
in the physics classroom, Simon’s environment made reliable belief-forming much more 
difficult. He needed a high level of ability to discriminate truth from falsehood, to interpret 
riddles in order to deduce the truth. He could only obtain knowledge in this environment if he 
had fairly advanced cognitive abilities. This illustrates how an agent’s epistemic environment 
can be knowledge undermining, because some environments require more skill to reliably 
believe, and to know, the same things.  
 
Compare the barn façade county case to a case of standard perceptual knowledge where an 
agent sees a barn in a field and forms the corresponding belief ‘there is a barn’. In both cases 
the agent sees a barn and thereby forms a belief. In neither case is the agent mistaken about 
what he saw. In neither case does the agent come to believe via an abnormal causal chain. In 
neither case is the agent believing irresponsibly, such as in the face of known defeaters, or 
knowingly without sufficient evidence. In fact, the only things that change between the cases 
is the agent’s environment and whether the agent knows. This suggests that the environment 
plays a role in the intuitive assessment of whether the agent knows, and thus the environment 
should play a role in our theory of knowledge.  
 
                                                
179 I intentionally made this a very epistemically friendly environment. In most cases of 
testimony the agent needs to be far more discriminating about what they believe in order for 
their belief to qualify as knowledge. They need to be scanning for whether the testifier seems 
trustworthy and reliable, and whether the proposition seems plausible, before their belief 
counts as knowledge.   
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Whilst it is a virtue of a theory of knowledge to get the intuitive extension right, it is even 
better if the theory of knowledge determines the cases for the same reasons that underlie 
these intuitions. A theory that does this vindicates not only the intuitive extension, but also 
our ordinary thinking and reasoning about knowledge.  
 
When she thought that Fred was in barn façade county, Ginger judged that Fred didn’t know 
because she believed he lacked the relevant abilities. Because nothing changed except the 
environment, this suggests that the environment is what undermined Fred’s ability. He didn’t 
have the high-grade competences demanded by the environment.180 This, I suggest, is our 
pre-theoretic reason behind the judgement that agents in barn façade county don’t know, and 
so our account of knowledge should reflect these reasons.  
 
At this juncture it may be useful to introduce some terminology. When talking about ‘what 
an agent can do’ there are many different interrelated terms: abilities, competences, 
capacities, skills, virtues… Even within the virtue epistemology literature these terms are 
used in various ways. When we are thinking about ‘what an agent can do’ there is a sense of 
‘ability’ that is not relative to the environment that the agent is in. A good judge of character 
is still a good judge of character even when she is in an environment full of talented 
deceivers. She is in unfortunate circumstances, but she is still the same person, and she hasn’t 
become any less skilful. In this sense ‘what a person can do’ is not relative to environments. 
This captures something about our thinking about abilities.  
 
In another sense what an agent can do is relative to environments. In an environment full of 
talented deceivers, she can no longer do what she can usually do, namely reliably judge 
people’s characters. I believe it is helpful to capture this by stipulating that what is fixed 
regardless of environment is the ‘cognitive character’ of the agent. What is dependent on the 
agent’s environment is the agent’s ‘cognitive ability’.  Whether an agent possesses the 
relevant cognitive ability is dependent on the environment she is in.  
 
In this terminology, S knows that p iff S’s belief that p is true through cognitive ability. We 
have previously understood the through relation with an inus account, and thus the account 
holds that:  
 
                                                
180 This reason can be held in contrast to, say, an agent in barn façade county not being salient 
in an explanation of the truth of her belief, or that it wasn’t intuitively through the agent that 
the belief was true. See also footnote 177.  
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New Proposal RVE: S knows that p iff S’s epistemic abilities are at least an inus 
condition for why S’s belief that p is true. 
 
The suggestion is thus that although Barney has the cognitive character to believe with ability 
in usual environments, and so has barn knowledge in usual environments, in the barn facade 
county environment he does not have the requisite cognitive ability. Thus Barney does not 
fulfil the conditions of RVE, and hence does not know.  
 
There is still much to be said, of course, about what having the abilities required by the 
environment amounts to. One approach is that the agent’s abilities are ‘good enough’ for the 
environment only if the agent knows in that environment. But this would fail to be a 
reductive account of knowledge. It defines knowledge in terms of abilities, but then says that 
an agent has the relevant abilities only when they have knowledge. In other words it aims to 
give an account of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but one of 
those conditions cannot be understood without reference to knowledge itself.181 It is still an 
informative account of knowledge, and so has some value but it is not fully illuminating. 
Perhaps we can do more? 
 
Recall that what we care about is whether the agent can be relied upon in the environment 
that they are in.182 One way to cash out an agent having the right abilities for an environment 
is if they can reliably form beliefs about that subject matter in the environment. The 
resembles Sosa’s 1992 suggestion that intellectual virtue is relativised to an environment and 
to the field of propositions that one is forming beliefs about. Sosa says an intellectual virtue 
is a faculty enabling one to ‘mostly attain the truth and avoid error in a certain field of 
propositions F, when in conditions C.’183 So we can think of virtues as FC pairs (fields of 
propositions matching the conditions).184   
 
This suggestion amounts to analysing the agent’s beliefs on a case-by-case basis. If there is 
something in her environment or conditions that means she can’t be reliable about beliefs in 
that field of propositions, then her belief is not formed with ability. Such an approach handles 
                                                
181 For more on reductive and non-reductive account of knowledge Pritchard (2010: 33-34 
and 58-59). 
182 See also Sosa (2007: 83-84). He discusses how given our interests what we care about is 
whether an agent can be relied upon in the environment he is in. He talks about how our 
concept of ability reflects this.     
183 Sosa (1992: 85). 
184 For development and refinements of this view see Sosa (1992: 88-89).  
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barn façade county style cases, as in these cases the agent does not have the abilities required 
to believe with reliability in that environment.  
 
Lackey raises a concern about this kind of response to the barn façade county case. She 
argues that it is poorly motivated to say that Barney’s abilities aren’t reliable in the 
environment he is in. She writes: 185 
 
By way of response to [barn façade county style cases], Greco argues that “S’s belief is 
the result of perception, and normally S’s perception would constitute a cognitive 
virtue, i.e., a reliable ability or power. However, reliability is relative to an 
environment, and S’s perception is not reliable relative to the environment in the 
example” (Greco, 2003, p. 130). While Greco may be right that reliability is relative to 
an environment, it is unclear why he thinks that Barney’s perception is not reliable in 
the example under consideration. For surely Barney would form mostly true beliefs by 
relying on perception in the environment in question, e.g., he would form true beliefs 
about farmers, horses, pigs, trees, grass and so on. The only sense in which his 
perception is not reliable in the relevant environment is with respect to distinguishing 
real barns from barn façades while driving in his car past them.  
 
Lackey’s concern is that it is problematic to say that Barney doesn’t have the abilities to 
detect barns, because he does have the abilities to detect other objects in the area, and so the 
required notion of ability is too fine-grained.  
 
But now we can see a response to this concern is available. The view that we are presently 
exploring holds that whether the agent has the ability depends, in part, on the content of the 
proposition being believed (the ‘f’ denotes the field of propositions). If this is right then he is 
still reliable with respect to cars and trees in his environment, because there are no façade 
cars and trees around. But this has no bearing on whether he is reliable with respect to barns. 
In contrast, the presence of fake barns is relevant to whether he knows about barns in the 
area. This does seem motivated because if we care about reliability, then we need to look at 
the proposition being believed. 
 
Whilst reliability in the circumstances helps constitute an agent’s having the requisite 
competences for an environment, there may be other constituents of ability. This idea needs 
further development. But for now I wish to note that it is both plausible and well-motivated 
                                                
185 Lackey (2007: 355). 
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that Barney doesn’t know because he doesn’t have the abilities required by the environment, 
and so when we are analysing knowledge we should be thinking about the influence of the 
environment on whether an agent knows. 
  
5.4 Ability versus Safety 
 
One may think that the suggestion offered here – that the agent doesn’t have the ability 
required by the environment, at least in part because the agent can’t reliably form beliefs 
about the field of propositions in the environment – amounts to a safety condition on 
knowledge. This is because my proposal holds that if the agent could easily have been wrong, 
then she doesn’t know. But this suggestion is importantly different from a safety condition. 
Firstly, by making the agent’s virtue central we satisfy more than merely the modal 
constraints on knowledge, we also build in that the agent needs to value the truth, be 
motivated towards the truth, or in other ways believe well. By making agent’s abilities 
central there are more resources to understand the agent’s role in generating knowledge.  
 
A brute safety condition may also be too strong and so rule out cases of bona fide knowledge. 
Consider a case where an agent is not in barn façade county, but could easily have been. Joe 
randomly chooses where he will take his Sunday drive, say. There are many different 
directions he could have travelled. Unbeknownst to him, some of these locales have fake 
barns rather than real barns. But if he is in a real-barn county, then there are no nearby fake 
barns. By chance he drives to a county that has only real barns. He sees one of these barns 
and forms the corresponding belief. In his environment he could not easily have formed a 
false belief, but he could easily have been in an environment where he would have formed 
many false beliefs. 
 
A safety condition appears to rule that Joe doesn’t know because his belief is unsafe (he 
could easily have formed a false belief). This is because the safety condition doesn’t 
distinguish between i.) that an agent could easily be wrong in his environment, and ii.) that an 
agent could easily have been in an environment such that he would (or could easily) form 
false beliefs were he to be in it. These are two different senses of ‘could easily be wrong’, 
and we have reason to think that only the former notion is knowledge-undermining (because, 
as we have seen, we care about what agents can do in the environments that actually obtain). 




The virtue-theoretic condition offered here has resources to explain why we might instead 
hold that Joe knows in this case. If what we care about is being able to rely on the agent (say, 
because a function of knowledge is to tag good informants), then it is crucial to this case that 
in the environment that Joe is in he will form only true beliefs about barns.  In the 
environment that obtains we can rely on him. In other words, only the friendliness of the 
obtaining conditions, not that of modally nearby conditions, bears on whether an agent 
knows. And this is something that the proposed account explains well. 
 
The appeal of the account does not rest on this aspect of knowledge, however, so if it proves 
to be misguided, because Joe doesn’t know in this case, or Joe’s beliefs are safe, this will not 
ramify broadly within my account.  
 
5.5 RVE and Value 
 
Recall that robust virtue epistemology construes knowledge as a species of achievement, and 
so holds that knowledge has the special final value of achievements, as the following 
argument indicates. 
 
(P1) Achievements are successes that are because of ability (Achievement thesis);  
(P2) knowledge is a cognitive success that is because of cognitive ability (Robust 
Virtue Epistemology);  
(C1) so, knowledge is a cognitive achievement (KA thesis);  
(P3) achievements are finally valuable (Value of Achievements thesis);  
(C2) so, knowledge has final value.  
 
Pritchard has argued that premise two is implausible. I have defended it by suggesting two 
key refinements for RVE: that we understand the through relation using Mackie’s inus 
conditions and that we understand abilities as environment relative.  A second problem 
pressed by Pritchard is that some successes because of ability are too easy to qualify as 
achievements, especially as the kind of achievements that have final value. He argues instead 
that achievements, at least those that have final value, involve the overcoming of some 
obstacle or the exercise of some great skill.186  
 
But we may have some weaker notion of achievement where all that is required is success 
through the exercise of ability. And even if not, perhaps success through ability corresponds 
                                                
186 Pritchard (2010). 
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to another thing of value: a person bringing about a state of affairs in the right sort of way, 
the agent getting what she intended, or her character working appropriately for her in the 
environment.187 Alas I cannot explore this idea fully here, but I want to emphasise that this 
second approach to the value problem remains plausible even if premise one incorrectly 
characterises achievement.  
 
Chapter Six: Summary 
 
I have defended the view that knowledge can be fruitfully understood using a virtue-theoretic 
framework. More specifically I have defended the RVE thesis that: 
   
RVE: S knows that p iff S’s cognitive success is through the exercise of her own 
cognitive abilities. 
 
I have understood this attribution relation, this through relation, using inus Mackie’s account 
of causation. My proposed RVE thesis can thus be expressed: 
 
New Proposal RVE: S knows that p iff S’s epistemic abilities are at least an inus 
condition for why S’s belief that p is true. 
 
I have further suggested that abilities should be understood as relative to environments. 
Although I have not offered a full account of abilities, I have suggested that if an agent 
cannot reliably form true beliefs in that environment then she does not have the abilities 
required by that environment.  
 
This view gets the intuitive extension right for a broad range of cases. By respecting that a 
plurality of factors can contribute to a belief’s being true, we have shown why agents possess 
knowledge in testimony cases and other cases of a similar structure (such as knowledge from 
books and apparatus). By explaining how in cases of knowledge the agent’s abilities must 
                                                
187 Sosa notes that when an agent bringing about an effect with her agency (rather than by 
luck or in a way not under their control) has a special kind of value. See Sosa (2007: 75-77) 
for examples in the realms of performance and art. He applies this insight to epistemology in 
the following chapter. Sosa also makes this point when he writes, ‘We prefer truth whose 
presence is the work of our intellect, truth that derives from our own virtuous performance. 
We do not want just truth that is given to us by happenstance, or by some alien agency, 
where we are given a belief that hits the mark of truth not through our own performance, not 




play a non-redundant role in getting to the truth, the account shows why agents do not know 
in Gettier cases. I have also provided an account of why the agent doesn’t know in the barn 
façade county case.  
 
By paying attention to why we withhold knowledge attributions in these cases, I hope I have 
vindicated not only the intuitive extension but also the impetus behind this extension. In 
Gettier cases the agent doesn’t know because their cognitive agency isn’t playing a role in 
why their belief is true. In barn façade county the agents don’t know because they don’t have 
the ability required by the environment.  
 
By defending the view that knowledge is an instance of success through ability, I have 
provided resources to explain the special value of knowledge. In particular my defence of 
premise two of the recently articulated argument defends the view that the distinctive value 
of knowledge is that of achievements. This suggestion can explain even the strongest 
formulations of the value platitude described in section 1.3: that knowledge is more valuable 
than a proper subset of its parts, and that when knowledge obtains a distinctive kind of value 
emerges, different in kind from the value of other epistemic standings. As I have explained, 
we should be sceptical that anti-luck virtue epistemology, a close rival of robust virtue 
epistemology, can explain these stronger value claims.  
 
By construing knowledge as an instance of a more familiar kind – as an achievement or 
success through ability – and by using an account of the through relation that tracks and 
explains our causal concepts, I have met the criteria of making it intelligible why we have the 
concept that we do.  
 
This view has the virtue of elegance. It doesn’t require a separate condition to deal with 
Gettier cases, for example, but instead employs virtue-theoretic apparatus to reveal which 
aspect of knowledge Gettier cases exploit (namely the disconnect between the agent and the 
truth, such that the agent does not gain the truth through the exercise of her own epistemic 
abilities.)  
 
By explaining the agent’s role in getting to the truth the view vindicates the ability platitude. 
It explains how knowledge is the product of ability without having an overly narrow 
conception of what this entails (compared to Greco’s salience account, for example). By 
explaining that in cases of knowledge the agent’s abilities are necessary in the circumstances, 
the view underscores the importance of the agent in knowledge. By explaining how in cases 
of knowledge the agent must possess the abilities required by the environment and field of 
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proposition, this may help to explain why knowledge attributions typically have the 
illocutionary force of praise and that knowledge is something that we usually credit an agent 
for having. 
 
The proposed view also vindicates the anti-luck platitude without a separate anti-luck 
condition. It holds that known beliefs are non-accidentally true because the agent produced 
the true belief through the exercise of a competence. In particular, the account rules out 
intervening luck (such as that found in standard Gettier cases) because if the agent is getting 
to the truth by luck then the agent’s ability is not an inus condition for the belief’s truth. The 
account rules out environmental luck because if the agent doesn’t have the abilities required 
by the environment (such that her belief would be only luckily true) then she doesn’t believe 
with ability, and so don’t fulfil the conditions on knowledge, even when her belief is true. 
 
The proposed view also has the resources to explain how some proponents of anti-luck 
epistemology read the anti-luck platitude too strongly. This is because the view articulates a 
difference between cases where an agent could easily be wrong in the actual environment, 
compared to where an agent could easily have been in an environment such that they could 
easily have been wrong.  
 
By construing knowledge as something that we can have, the view accords with the anti-
sceptical platitude. Its conditions are not excessively demanding. This account rules that we 
know a lot of what we take ourselves to know.  
 
There are still many aspects of this view to develop – such as the relation between know 
how, knowledge by acquaintance and propositional knowledge, and exploring how the view 
fits with various normative roles we often take knowledge to have. Most importantly, this 
view can be developed with more work on the nature of the cognitive virtues. The view 
offered here has developed the structure of RVE, and in particular the nature of the through 
relation. My next stage would be to investigate what kinds of capacities or character traits 
count as knowledge-conducive.  
 
Thus I hope to have shown that RVE and its associated account of the value of knowledge is 
a promising account, and one that we should take seriously. I hope too to have made 
plausible that my version of RVE captures the nature of knowledge better than other 
available accounts. Finally I hope I have defended the view from the apparent dilemma 
pressed by Lackey and Pritchard, and thereby shown more generally that RVE is a plausible 
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